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ABSTRACT
The manufacturing plant location decisions made by five Massachusetts
biotechnology firms were examined. Information was gathered from company
literature and by means of questionnaire-based interviews with senior corporate
staff involved in the decisions. The five companies were all in the
biotherapeutic segment of the industry, and ranged in size from 90 to 1500
employees. In their location decisions, the factors most frequently cited as
important were: labor availability; proximity to existing company facilities, and
other agglomerization economies; taxes; business climate; economic
development assistance; and overall costs. All firms quantified costs, but did
not make their final decisions on the basis of cost alone; other considerations
took precedence, in some cases. Risk-minimization appeared to be at least as
great a concern as profit-maximization for this group of companies, perhaps
reflecting the relatively great uncertainties with which their decision-makers
were faced in product development, approval, and manufacturing. All five
companies had urban headquarters and research and development facilities;
three located their manufacturing plants in cities, two in the suburbs.
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Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies & Planning
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dr. Sandra Lambert, my advisor, for her guidance,
patience and suggestions for improvements of this paper. I also thank
Professor Charles Cooney, co-director of M.I.T.'s Program on the
Pharmaceutical Industry, for his invaluable advice, direction, and information
about the Massachusetts biotechnology industry. I thank other Center for Real
Estate faculty: Dr. Marc Louargand, for suggesting appropriate studies; and
Professor William Wheaton, for shaping my "neoclassic" thinking about
manufacturing location.
I am also grateful for the time, good humor, and openness of the
biotechnology company managers, consultants, and government officials, who
answered my questions. I also thank my dear and patient husband, Tony, for
trying to explain to me about "boning chromosomes" (genetic engineering)
nearly 20 years ago, and for his typing, copy editing skills, and child care
expertise.
CONTENTS
Page
Introduction ............................................................................... . ...... .... 6
Chapter 1: The Biotechnology Industry ............................................................ 10
Geographic Distribution............................................................................. 11
Financing/Commercialization Strategies............................................... 13
Production Processes.............................................................. ......... .. 15
The Product-Cycle Concept..................................................................... 18
Biotechnology Industry Product-Cycle.....................................................20
Comparison of Biotechnology and Microelectronics Industries......... 21
Space Requirements ............................................................ .... 21
Massachusetts Biotechnology Industry .................................................. 23
Labor Factors................................................................................ ..... 2 5
Massachusetts Survey.............................................................................. 26
Chapter 2: Industrial Location Theory and Locational Decision-Making........30
Methodologies............................................................................... ....- 30
Neoclassicist........................................................................ ..... ...30
Behavioralist........................................................................... ....... 33.....33
Structuralist................................................................ .............. .. 34
Manufacturing Location Search and Decision-Making............................. 35
Location Factors in Industry in General.................................................. 36
Location Factors in High-Technology Industry..................................... 41
Comparison of Location Factors in Biotechnology,
High-Technology, and General Industry .......................................... 43
Location Framework for the Biotechnology Industry.................................. 46
Neoclassicist Issues.................................................................................. 47
Behavioralist Issues .......................................................................... .... 49
Structuralist Issues ..................................................................................... 50
S u m m a ry .................................................................................................... . 5 1
Chapter 3: Case Studies..................................................................................... 53
Study A: BASF Bioresearch Corporation.................................................... 53
Company Identity........................................................................................ 53
Company History ....................................................................................... 53
Manufacturing Location Decision............................................................ 55
General Business Strategy..................................................................... 57
F ina ncing ..................................................................................................... . 5 7
Study B: Genzyme Corporation ..................................................................... 57
Company Identity........................................................................................ 57
Company History ....................................................................................... 58
Manufacturing Location Decision............................................................ 60
G eneral Business Strategy....................................................................... 61
Financing.................................................................................... - .... 62
Study C : Alpha-Beta Technology ................................................................. 62
Com pany Identity................................................................ .. ...... 62
Com pany History ....................................................................................... 63
M anufacturing Location Decision............................................................ 63
G eneral Business Strategy....................................................................... 65
Financing............................................................................ ......... . ........ 66
Study D: Com pany X...................................................................................... 66
Com pany Identity....................................................................................... 66
Com pany History ....................................................................................... 67
M anufacturing Location Decision............................................................. 68
Future M anufacturing Plant Siting .......................................................... 70
G eneral Business Strategy.................................................................. .. 71
Financing................................................................................... ..... ..72
Study E: Biogen ............................................................................................... 72
Com pany Identity....................................................................................... 72
Com pany History ....................................................................................... 73
M anufacturing Location Decision............................................................ 74
G eneral Business Strategy....................................................................... 77
Financing.................................................................................................. 77
C hapter 4: A nalysis .............................................................................. ......... ... 78
Individual C om panies' Location Decisions ................................................. 78
BASF Bioresearch Corporation ............................................................... 78
G enzym e Corporation................................................................................ 79
Alpha-Beta Technology............................................................................. 80
Com pany X ................................................................................. ..... .... 80
Biogen............................................................................................................ 80
Correspondence of Observations with the Theoretical Framework.......81
Neoclassicist Issues.................................................................................. 81
Behavioralist Issues .................................................................................. 83
Structuralist Issues ..................................................................................... 83
Locational Decision-M aking .......................................................................... 85
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research..................87
Appendix A : Q uestionnaire.................................................................................. 93
Appendix B: Sum m ary of C hapter 19 ............................................................... 98
Appendix C : C ase Sum m ary M atrix.................................................................. 99
Bibliography................................................................................................ . ... .-1 1 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the manufacturing locational decisions of five firms
in the biotechnology industry in Massachusetts, in order to determine which
location decision processes and locational factors are deemed important by
these firms and how they are different from or similar to manufacturing decisions
and factors of aggregate industry groups and of other high-technology industry
groups. Several local biotechnology firms are currently moving to the
manufacturing stage in the product development process, from being primarily
engaged in research and development and pilot plant trials. Knowledge of
where and how they decide to locate their manufacturing facilities is useful for
other biotechnology industry decision makers, since the industry is in a phase of
rapid growth, and other companies will soon need to expand into manufacturing
facilities. These companies will be faced with difficult choices, because of the
high cost of manufacturing space may be coupled with capital constraints. How
some firms have managed their location decision-making process to address
growth within their constraints is shown. Finally, the potential location in
Massachusetts of these manufacturing facilities has important implications for
high-wage manufacturing employment stability.
For this paper, the specific firms surveyed were in the biotherapeutic
segment of the industry. The first chapter discusses the biotechnology industry
in general, on a national and state basis, to provide a context for the case
studies. The second chapter surveys the location theory and location decision-
making literature, which is broadly catalogued in three methodologies:
neoclassicist, behavioralist, and structuralist. To develop a framework for the
case studies and analysis, this chapter examines important concepts in each
methodology, and relates the biotechnology industry to these methodologies.
In view of the findings in locational literature, I hypothesized that if a firm's
overall size is small, and if its manufacturing space needs, both short and long
term, are relatively modest, then it will likely remain in an urban location. This
likelihood is based on the known preference of biotechnology firms for proximity
of their manufacturing facilities to their research and development sites, and a
ability to expand in place, if expansion space needs are modest. However,
much depends on the importance placed within the firm on cost-minimization
criteria, and whether economic development assistance is available. I
hypothesized that these small biotechnology firms will tend to stay in urban
locations, take advantage of urbanization and localization economies such as
proximity to skilled labor and availability of infrastructure, and make location
decisions on an informal basis, unless costs are prohibitively high.
I also hypothesized that biotechnology firms with large manufacturing
facility requirements will increasingly decentralize, moving intra-regionally to
suburban locations where lower land costs predominate, but more importantly,
land is more available. As with small firms, existing urban locations are
attractive for large firm expansion because of labor availability and labor quality
there, but the unavailability of appropriate land will discourage siting in urban
centers unless government intervention occurs, particularly in the physical
assembling of land and in assuming environmental liabilities. Urban land cost
may be an issue; however, cost minimization criteria will not be as important as
other business goals for these firms.
The third chapter presents five case studies of Massachusetts
biotechnology companies which have made or are about to make a major
manufacturing plant location decision. The companies range in size from 90 to
1500 employees; one of them is a division of an international company with
over 100,000 employees. The case studies are based on a face-to-face
interview protocol; they cover company identity, history, nature of existing space
and plant, nature of the manufacturing location decision or decisions, company
financing, and business strategy.
The subjects of the five case studies are Massachusetts biotherapeutics
firms, which were identified through a recent survey (Malaterre, 1993) as having
recently made or being about to make a manufacturing location decision.
Company contacts were individuals recommended by Professor Charles
Cooney, co-director of M.I.T.'s Program on the Pharmaceutical Industry, as
industry people willing to talk about their experiences. In one case, the name of
the firm, my interview contacts there, and the community location were altered to
protect confidential information.
A questionnaire was developed (see Appendix A) as an interview
protocol, based on Roger W. Schmenner's (1982) questionnaire. Face-to-face
interviews were conducted with senior corporate staff involved in the location
decisions. Additional or follow-up data were gathered through telephone
interviews. It became apparent that, because the biotechnology industry was in
its infancy, manufacturing plant rlocation questions were not relevant; in situ
expansion or new plant location decisions were the main concerns. The
questionnaire was also designed to ask about overall business strategy and
goals, because it became clear that how and why location decisions are made
are components of an overall business strategy and culture, whether explicitly
or implicitly articulated.
The questionnaire has many open-ended, non-quantitative questions
and I made an attempt to allow interviewees to tell the story, rather than prompt
them for information. Insofar as possible, I asked companies the same
questions. Prior to the interviews, I read about the industry both in
Massachusetts and nation-wide, and also each company's annual report (all of
the case study companies are publicly held).
The firms selected do not necessarily represent a cross section of the
biotherapeutic segment. They are not only all high growth firms, but three out of
the five represent the largest Massachusetts firms in terms of employment. All
have the explicit goal of vertical integration. As a result, functions from research
and development through commercial production, at least to bulk protein
manufacture, are desired as in-house activities. Other biotherapeutic firms and
other biotechnology firms may choose to remain as research and development
labs only, with revenues generated from licensing their proprietary technology,
for example. Others may be forced to cede manufacturing autonomy in
alliances or buy-outs because of capital constraints.
In all cases, specific cost data about location decisions were confidential
and not available to me. I interviewed one major decision-maker in each
company, and occasionally, a second person involved in the location decision.
Firms typically had made several location decisions in their company history;
the intent of my questions was to focus on a major plant decision, made
recently, in which commercial-scale manufacturing was a significant component
of the plan. For consistency, I limited the study to decisions that dealt with
genetically-engineered biotherapeutics, as opposed to other products.
The fourth chapter presents the case study data in a summary matrix,
which is analyzed according to the location theory concepts developed in
Chapter 2. The analysis identifies common locational factors across all five
firms, identifies differences, and attempts to elucidate the important distinctions
across different firms' decisions.
The final chapter draws conclusions from the data and presents some
generalizations about biotechnology firms' location decision-making. These
generalizations may be useful for other firms about to make similar decisions.
Chapter 1: The Biotechnology Industry
Biotechnology as an industry segment generally includes "those firms
which employ the techniques of genetic engineering and molecular biology in
the manufacture of peptides, proteins, and other biological materials, for use in
health care, chemical, agricultural, or environmental applications," according to
Professor Charles Cooney. For the purpose of this study, biotechnology
companies engaged in biotherapeutics were chosen for analysis. The following
information is intended to provide an industry context.
In 1992, the national industry was composed of 1231 companies, with
225 companies publicly traded (Burrill and Lee, 1992). Companies were
typically classified according to their primary markets, defined as follows:
Table 1
Segment Percentaae of companies
Human health care--diagnostics 28(disease detecting products)
Human health care-biotherapeutics 38
(pharmaceutical drug development
and manufacture)
Ag-bio (microbial crop protectants, plant 10
genetics, food processing, animal health)
Suppliers to the industry (instrumentation, 16
lab supplies, reagents, other supplies)
Chemical, environmental and services 8
Source: Burrill and Lee (1992)
As indicated, 66% of companies were in human health care. As well, human
health care companies represented 83% of public companies. Total company
growth in numbers from the previous year was modest, from 1107 to 1231, but
employees increased from 70,000 to 79,000. Revenues exceeded $5.9 billion,
with research and development expenses at $4.9 billion, and net L= at $3.4
billion. However, product sales growth from the previous year, for public
companies, was 31%.
Burrill and Lee (1992) categorized companies by size; small companies
(1-50 employees) predominate, with a 76% share of the industry's overall
employment.
Table 2
Company Size % of Total Industry % of Public Companies
small (1-50) 76 48
mid-size (51-135) 16 31
large (136-299) 6 10
top-tier ( 300) 2 11
Source: Burrill and Lee (1992)
Most companies in all size categories posted losses at the end of 1991, ranging
from an average $2.4 million for small companies to $20.9 million for the top
tier.
Geographic Distribution
Table 3 shows the distribution of biotechnology companies nationwide.
As shown in the table, the San Francisco, New York-Tristate and Boston areas
possess the largest concentrations of firms. Companies in these three areas
alone employ 36% of the industry's total workforce.
Table 3
Geographic Segment Demographics
Percent of Public company size breakdown Public company market breakdown within
industry within within geographic region (percent) geographic region (percent)
region
Chem,
Environ-
mental
Ptblic Al Diag- Thera- and
cos. cos. Srnal Mid-size Large Top-tier nostic peutic Ag-bio Supplier Services
San Francisco Bay Area 16 15 39 31 11 19 11 70 8 8 3
New York Tri-State Area 15 11 54 2 15 3 15 76 0 9 0
Boston Area 14 10 33 37 17 13 14 80 3 3 0
San Diego Area 10 8 29 62 9 0 14 67 14 5 0
Washington DC Area 6 9 3D 39 7 15 15 54 15 8 8
Los Angeles/Orange Co. 6 6 50 2 0 25 33 67 0 0 0
Philadelphia/South NJ 5 3 46 18 18 18 0 73 18 0 9
Seattle Area 3 4 43 43 0 14 0 86 0 14 0
Florida 3 2 71 0 0 29 0 100 0 0 0
Minnesota 3 2 86 17 0 17 33 33 0 34 0
Colorado 2 2 6) 20 3) 0 0 80 20 0 0
Michigan 2 2 60 40 0 0 60 0 2) 20 0
Texas 2 4 s 2 25 0 25 50 25 0 0
North Carolina 1 3 67 33 0 0 67 33 0 0 0
Source: Burrill and Lee (1992)
In part, these concentrations are a direct result of the history of biotechnology,
which had its genesis in university research in molecular biology conducted at
Harvard, MIT, Stanford and Caltech, and funded largely by federal agencies.
Virtually all biotechnology start-up companies were founded, managed or
directed by university professors, beginning with the founding of Cetus in
California in 1971. A common model was for an academic to team up with
venture capitalists; initially, public stock offerings were not common, nor were
limited partnerships or alliances with chemical or pharmaceutical companies
until the mid to late 1980's. Pharmaceutical companies (historically
concentrated in the New York-Tristate area) entered the business actively
beginning in 1983, in five ways: (1) in-house research labs, (2) contracts with
universities and with the professor-initiated companies, (3) licensing and
marketing agreements, (4) limited research and development partnerships, and
(5) equity purchases (Hall et al., 1988).
Financing/Commercialization Strategies
Currently, the biotechnology industry is primarily funded by the equity
markets, through private placements, public stock offerings, and corporate
partnerships. Partial acquisition by a pharmaceutical company is an example of
the latter; for example, a substantial or controlling portion of a biotechnology
company's stock may be purchased by a large pharmaceutical company.
Biotechnology companies are also forging innovative alliances with other
biotechnology firms, as well as pharmaceutical firms, combining resources with
them, or initiating product swaps. In these alliances, companies place
emphasis on royalty percentages and retention of U.S. manufacturing and
marketing rights. In some alliances for research and development funding,
benchmark payments for specific achievements are made, according to
Professor Charles Cooney.
Public equity capital, both initial and secondary public offerings, has
been a substantial source of funding. ($3.24 billion was raised in the July 1991
through June 1992 period.) Currently, however, market uncertainties have
dampened these financing activities. President Clinton's signing of the
Biodiversity Agreement, and prospective health care reform, with its cost
containment provisions, have injected uncertainty into the capital markets.
Many firms, even those with proprietary processes or products, fear facing
reduction in prospective profits. (Gupta, 1993)
Unlike traditional pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology firms have
very little debt financing or internal financing. The primary factors restricting
asset debt financing are: lack of credit-worthiness of the industry due to its
annual operating losses (despite its high capital reserves), restrictive Federal
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Reserve-imposed bank lending practices on real estate in general, and
potential lenders' unwillingness to lend on what are perceived as special
purpose properties without potential resale value (NAIOP, 1992). Table 4
describes financing alternatives.
Table 4: Biotechnology Financing Alternatives
Type
Grants and
Gifts
Venture
Capital
Private
Placements
Strategic
Alliances
Amount
(millions)
$0-5
$1-10
$1-35
$1-40
Initial Public $15-100
Offering
Secondary
Public
Offerings
SWORDS
R&D
Partnerships
$20-150
$20-50
$1-50
Debt:
Convertible $1-100
Asset based $1-50
Unsecured $1-10
Operations Limited
Company
Age
Inception to
5 yrs
1-5 yrs
1-10 yrs
Company
Company
Stage
Pre-seed
Advantages
"Free-money"
Pre-clinicals Availability.
Substantial VC
involvement
Preclinical-
advanced
clinicals
Higher valuation
Unlimited Clinical to Substitute for
maturity integration.
Substantial size
3-10 yrs
3 yrs +
Sponsor
must be
public
1 to unlimited
1-10
1 to unlimited
Incubation Large financings
possible. No cash
servicing required
Start-up to Same as IPO, but
maturity often at higher
valuations
Pre-clinical to
clinical trials
R&D
"Off balance sheet"
Theoretically,
avoids dilution
Same as SWORDS,
but some tax
leverage
Clinical to Usually "cheap."
maturity Sold based upon
convertibility.
Generally not based
on yield
Developing
Over 5 yrs Operational
1 to unlimited Operational
No dilution
No dilution
Cheapest form of
financing
Source: Burrill and Lee (1992)
Disadvantages
Limited availability
and size. Some
grant-specific
requirements
Lower valuations.
Substantial VC
involvement
Limited availability
"Futures" can be the
most expensive
financing.
Markets highly
cyclical; public
valuation not
completely
manageable
Infrastructure
requirements
Repurchase can be
costly. Technical
difficulties
Same as
SWORDS-liquidity
and transferability is
limited
Debt service
requirements
Initially for buildings
and equipment, then
receivables/
inventory
Generally
unavailable
Limited source of
cash
In an Ernst and Young survey of biotechnology company CEOs, 42%
said their goal was fully integrated facilities (conducting all phases from
research and development through commercialization of the product) and 27%
wanted to build their own manufacturing facility (Burrill and Lee, 1992). Such
vertical integration suggests that the biotechnology firms would remain diverse
and independent. Autonomy, retention of proprietary technology, quality control
and full capture of profits are some of the benefits of vertical integration. More
cautious growth strategies and simultaneous pursuit of multiple product
developments are methods companies use to attain this goal. Financing
arrangements are likely to be "hands-off" corporate partnerships or public stock
offerings for these companies; they may also be more aggressive about seeking
economic development assistance.
Production Processes
The industry is characterized by complex production processes, a long
product cycle (see Table 5 below), and chronic shortage of working capital
because of long lead times to commercial production. A noteworthy
characteristic contributing to the long product lead time of the industry,
particularly for the biotherapeutic segment, is the level of federal regulation,
primarily through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), whose product
testing and approval criteria must be met before pharmaceutical products can
be marketed. For these approvals, safety and efficacy of the product, and
process and manufacturing consistency must be demonstrated. It is noteworthy
that recently, the FDA has signaled that product cost effectiveness is an
additional criterion for approval.
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Table 5
Financing
Sources
Product Stage
Space
Requirements
Biotechnology Company Life Cycle
Research Development
0-3 years 4-7 years
$5-10 million $25-60 million
Investor seed Corporate
money, venture partners, Initial
capital public offering
Discovery Clinical testing
R & D lab space Expanded
administrative,
Small
manufacturing
Commercialization
8-12 years
$100+ million
Secondary
financings, Product
sales
Market introduction
Production
facilities
Source: Feinstein Partners, NAIOP (1992)
The production process (through the developmental and commercial-
ization phases) is defined and constrained by this regulatory framework, as well
as the actual product outcome desired. The regulatory timetable has been
described in more detail elsewhere (Belden, 1993; Webb, 1991). An example
of the complexity of the production process for an enzyme (a potential
biotherapeutic) is shown in Figure 1. Table 6 details the necessary regulatory
steps during the developmental phase.
Strain
development MICROBIAL CELLS
1. Derepression
2. Genetic
engineering
Figure 1. Stages in the production of purified enzymes (Jacobsson et al, 1986).
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Table 6
Biotechnology Industry
Approval Cycle for a Medical Therapeutic Product
PHASE GENERAL ACTIVITY
(Preclinical)
IND
(Clinical Trials)
Phase I
Phase Il
Phase III
Final FDA
Approval (NDA)
Research and testing on animals for
efficacy & toxicity as well as replicating
production
Filing of "Investigative New Drug"
application. New data requests could
require 6-12 months of additional testing
Tests on healthy humans at multiple
centers to determine product safety
Tests on limited group with the medical
problem to determine product safety
Test of large numbers of patients to
determine product efficacy
Collection, correlation, preparation &
submission of test data and product
review
TOTAL
TIME SPAN
1-2 years
1-2 months
1-2 years
1 year
2-3 years
1-2 years
6-10 years
Source: S. Brainard, M. Podsedly, L. Sutlif, "Biotechnology Industry Analysis",
Boston College School of Management (1989); Webb (1991)
The Product-Cycle Concept
The product-cycle concept argues that each stage of a product's
development has different requirements, in terms of management, technology,
labor, external economies and capital. It is summarized in the figure below, for
manufacturing generally.
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Product-Cycle Phase
Requirements Early Growth Mature
Management W-l
Scientific-
Engineering w
Know-How
Unskilled Labor
ExternalEconomies
Capital
Figure 2. The product-cycle and production inputs. The relative importance of
each category of input at each phase in the product-cycle is indicated by the
size of the corresponding square. Source: Watts (1987)
Relatively fewer, or more, of various production inputs are required at different
phases of the product cycle. The early stage typically requires high levels of
scientific and technical inputs, and external economies derived from access to
information sources and supplier linkages, for example. Capital investment is
low relative to the later stages, because investment in fixed assets, for example,
does not occur at the early stage (production runs are short and experimental).
At this product stage as well, products and processes are undergoing constant
creation and revision, requiring a high input of skilled labor. Greater
management skills and capital are required in the growth phase of a typical
company, relative to the early phase, to plan expansion and to invest in capital
equipment. The mature phase is characterized by mass production using a
stable technology. The major capital investment required to set up the mass
production is offset at this stage by the labor input, which is less skilled relative
to that in the early and growth phases. (Watts, 1987)
Biotechnology Industry Product-Cycle
The biotechnology industry fits the product-cycle pattern overall, with
some differences from manufacturing in general. Because of the long times to
production, biotechnology firms require more capital in the early phase, relative
to manufacturing in general, as well as in the highly automated mature phase.
Scientific, engineering and technical inputs are higher for biotechnology than
for a typical low-tech manufacturer through all three phases, and external
economies are typically higher for biotechnology, relative to manufacturing in
general, in the growth phase as well. For biotechnology, unskilled labor
requirements are lower, relative to those in manufacturing in general, in all
three phases. A suggested modification of the product-cycle for the
biotechnology industry is pictured in Figure 3.
Prcoduct-Cycle Phas e
Requirements Early Growth Mature
Management
Scientific-
Engineering
Know-How
Unskilled Labor
External
Economies
Capital
Figure 3. Biotechnology product-cycle and production inputs. Biotechnology is
represented by the shaded squares; where the relative importance of a
requirement in the biotechnology industry differs from that of the same
20
requirement in manufacturing in general, the latter is indicated by a blank
square.
Comparison of Biotechnology and Microelectronics Industries
The California biotechnology industry has been compared to another
industry in California, microelectronics, partly because both are high-technology
industries, and are clustered in the same area (San Francisco). Further
similarities between the two industries include dependence upon a highly
skilled labor force, and proximity of both kinds of firms to universities and related
research and developement facilities. (Watts, 1987)
Microelectronics differs from biotechnology in having not only a
substantially shorter product cycle length, but lower capital requirements as
well. In addition, microelectronics companies have had a different history. They
were frequently started by engineers who had had prior corporate experience,
unlike the biotechnology industry's academics, who generally had no
production or product-marketing experience. (Blakely and Nishikawa, 1991)
Microelectronics products are sold as components of more complex
systems, whereas many biotech products are.. .sold to end users. The
nature of research and development also differs. With
microelectronics, variations and incremental changes in style and
performance characteristics occur, with biotechnology, every product
starts from original science.. .biotechnological innovation is not
systemic in nature and compatibility among different processes and
products is not an issue. (Blakely and Nishikawa, 1991, pp. 8-9)
Although the industries differ substantially, there are locational factors common
to high-technology firms in general, as will be shown in the sections that follow.
Space Requirements
General spatial details should be highlighted: When companies start, lab
bench space (2000-5000 square feet) for several research scientists is the
space requirement. When clinical trials begin for fermentation-based products,
for example, companies require pilot plants, ranging in size from 5000 to 20,000
square feet, to support 50-100 liter production batches for these trials. These
plants may be an expansion of the laboratory space used for basic research, or
may be located in a separate pilot plant facility, often in the same building as the
research and development function. After the FDA approves a product license,
a 10- to 1000-fold scale-up of the production process occurs in a separate,
dedicated manufacturing plant of 50,000 to 200,000 square feet. Before a plant
can actually start marketable production, a GMP (good manufacturing practices)
certification is required from the FDA, as well as a plant and process license,
and an establishment license application approval (ELA), typically engendering
an additional six-month delay in production after facility construction is
completed. Once these FDA manufacturing approvals are gained, it is typically
easier to amend them for new product manufacturing than to start the process
anew at a new plant location. (Webb, 1991)
Costs associated with manufacturing plant construction range from $300
to $1000 per square foot (NAIOP, 1992). In general, functional areas at the
manufacturing plant are divided into bioreactors, purification, quality control and
quality assurance, HVAC, and warehousing. They are typically two- to three-
story, new structures. Retrofitting of existing industrial buildings occurs, but is
usually not cost-effective because of high floor-to-ceiling height requirements
and high floor load requirements. Ceiling heights must be designed to
accommodate specialized HVAC systems to control particulate flow,
temperature and humidity in production areas. Energy and plumbing systems
are specialized as well. For some products, sterility must be maintained
through installation of seamless stainless steel equipment, provision of a sterile
water processing plant and special treatment of waste before it is discharged
into the public sewer system (Belden, 1993).
As noted above, the rigor and expense of plant requirements are
dependent on the process used and product manufactured. In addition,
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biotherapeutics are typically low-volume high-value products, and thus have
low shipping costs. The effect of transport costs on the manufacturing location
decision will be described in the section that follows.
Massachusetts Biotechnology Industry
The biotechnology industry in Massachusetts mirrors the industry nation-
wide. The commonwealth possessed approximately 128 firms in 1992,
representing 10% of all companies, with 80% concentrated in the
biotherapeutics market segment. Fifty percent of the firms are small and mid-
size companies, having 135 or fewer employees. Employment in 1992 was
estimated at 13,530, with total sales of $471 million posted in 1991 (Malaterre,
1993; Burrill and Lee, 1992).
Figure 4 shows the location of Massachusetts biotechnology companies;
firms are predominantly in urban areas or on major highways. Zoning or board
of health regulations are formally in place in these communities (approximately
25 state-wide), explicitly to regulate genetic engineering research. These
regulations typically incorporate by reference NIH guidelines regarding the use
of recombinant DNA, and provide for a local inspection board. (Recombinant
DNA technology is subject to an extraordinary degree of regulation because it is
relatively new and radical; fermentation and enzyme technologies are older.)
Adoption of such regulations by a community sends a signal to the
biotechnology industry that it is encouraged to locate there (Griffith, 1992).
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Piusficld
Number of 0-20
employecs per 20-50 *
company: 50-100 ,o [ Fall River
>100 9 '
Figure 4. Location of Massachusetts biotechnology firms (Malaterre, 1993).
Massachusetts firms occupy about 7 million square feet of lab, office or
manufacturing space, with 3 million square feet in institutional use in the Boston
area around major research hospitals, and 4 million square feet in corporate
use. Of this corporate square footage, 1.8 million are in Cambridge and 0.7
million are in the Worcester area. Institutions are usually owners and
corporations typically lessees of the space. In Massachusetts, biotechnology
laboratory space is fully occupied, with unmet demand estimated at 0.4 million
square feet in Cambridge and 0.35 million square feet in Worcester. Projected
additional demand is estimated at 8.1 million square feet by the year 2000 for
all types of biotechnology facilities (NAIOP, 1992).
The real estate development community has already identified sites in
Boston, Cambridge, Worcester/Shrewsbury and other communities. These
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sites can support the 8-9 million square feet of projected demand (Feinstein,
1992). However, most Massachusetts firms are still in the research and
development or clinical trials stage, and find it impossible to access asset debt
financing for construction of base facilities or for tenant improvements. The lack
of credit enhancement to secure such financing is seen by the Massachusetts
real estate development community as one of the major obstacles to the
construction of biotechnology facilities (NAIOP, 1992).
A variety of state and local economic development policies, financing
and tax initiatives have been catalogued and recommended in other studies, to
deal with the specific issue of credit enhancement, as well as the broader issue
of the attraction/retention of biotechnology facilities. Economic development
incentives have also been advocated for attracting and retaining manufacturing.
The nature and quality of jobs generated, both directly and indirectly, from
manufacturing employment (average salary of over $30,000 and up to 17.5 jobs
per $1 million in activity, consistent with the traditional pharmaceutical
manufacturers' job-multiplier effect) have been emphasized (Belden, 1993;
Malaterre, 1993; NAIOP, 1992; Webb, 1991; Massachusetts has a variety of
programs in place at the local and state level, described by Belden and NAIOP).
A recent development in Massachusetts economic development
incentives has been the passage of legislation (M.G.L., Chapter 19, in March
1993). Three components of this new legislation that have important
implications for the biotechnology industry are: the creation of an Emerging
Technology Fund, an increase in the investment tax credit, and tax increment
financing, according to Joseph Donovan of the Massachusetts Office of
Business Development (Appendix B more fully describes these programs).
Labor Factors
Massachusetts biotechnology employment is currently at about 13,530,
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as noted above. The projected employment in various functions is shown in
Table 7.
Table 7
Employment Evolution in Massachusetts Biotechnology
(estimated number of employees)
1992 1995 2000
Employ. (%) Employ. (%) Employ. (%)
R & D 5,610 (42) 7,800 (41) 11,000 (36)
Manufacturing 5,370 (39) 7,500 (40) 13,200 (44)
Administration 2.550 (19) 3.450 (19) 5.700 (20)
TOTAL 13,530 (100) 18,750 (100) 30,000 (100)
Source: Malaterre (1993)
Skill levels of workers are estimated as over 90% with bachelors degree
or higher at the research and development stage in the product cycle, 66% at
the pilot plant stage and 43% at the commercial plant stage. Total employees in
a pilot plant averaged 41, and at a commercial plant, 53. The commercial plant,
with automated production processes and larger unit operations, requires fewer
employees per unit of output than the pilot plant.
Massachusetts Survey
Malaterre completed a survey in late 1992 of 40 Massachusetts
biotechnology firms, asking them to rank the importance of various locational
factors, for both research and development and manufacturing facilities. The
strengths and weaknesses of Massachusetts vis A vis locational factors were
also surveyed. His summary tables are reproduced below:
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Table 8
R & D Facility Location Factor
(ranked by mean response of the total sample)
Locational Factors Massachusetts(1 =very important, Strengths/weaknesses
5=not important) (1 =strength, 3=weakness)
Mean Variance Mean Variance
Proximity to universities 1.5 0.4 1.1 0.1
Proximity to medical institutions 1.7 0.7 1.1 0.1
Availability/cost of space for expansion 2 0.9 2.3 0.5
Availability/cost of existing facility 2.1 0.9 2.2 0.4
State government attitudes 2.1 1 2.3 0.6
Local government attitudes 2.1 1 2.2 0.4
History of local regulations 2.3 1.1 2.2 0.4
Reasonable cost of living 2.4 0.9 2.7 0.3
Availability/cost of land 2.5 1.1 2.4 0.4
Proximity to other R&D biotech firms 2.6 0.9 1.2 0.1
Founder/CEO wanted to live in area 2.8 2.2 1.7 0.3
Infrastructures/Transportation 2.8 0.7 1.8 0.5
Cultural facilities 2.8 1.3 1.2 0.2
Access to venture capital funds 3.1 1.8 1.6 0.3
Availability/cost of incubator facility 3.1 1.9 2.1 0.4
Proximity to technology transfer center 3.3 1.5 1.6 0.3
Proximity to post-high voc./tech. schools 3.3 1.4 1.8 0.2
(Total sample = 40)
Source: Malaterre (1993)
Table 9
Manufacturing Facility Location Factor(ranked by mean response of the total sample)
Locational Factors(1=very important,
5=not important)
Mean Variance
Massachusetts
Strengths/weaknesses(1 =strength, 3=weakness)
Mean Variance
Availability/cost of space for expansion
Availability/cost of land
Proximity to firm R&D facility
State government attitudes
Availability/cost of existing facility
Labor cost
Reasonable cost of living
Local government attitudes
Cost of utilities
Majority of employees live near site
History of local regulations
Infrastructures/Transportation
Proximity to post-high voc./tech. schools
State/local training programs
Proximity to universities
Proximity to other manufacturing biotech f
Proximity to medical institutions
Cultural facilities
Founder/CEO wanted to live in area
Proximity to major customers
(Total sample = 40)
firms
1.8
1.9
2
2
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.3
2.4
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.6
2.8
3.2
3.2
3.3
3.4
0.7
0.7
0.7
1
1
0.6
0.8
1
0.6
0.8
1.
0.6
1.1
0.6
0.7
0.7
1.2
1.3
2
0.9
2.4
2.4
1.6
2.4
2.3
2.4
2.4
2.2
2.3
1.7
2
1.9
1.9
2.1
1.4
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.7
1.9
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.2
Source: Malaterre (1993)
For research and development facilities, the most important location
factors were: proximity to knowledge centers (universities and medical
institutions); availability and cost of both existing space and space for
expansion; and government attitudes, described in the questionnaire as taxes,
financing, or regulations. In contrast, for manufacturing facilities, availability and
cost factors, for expansion space and land, had priority. Proximity to the firm's
research and development facility was rated as the third most important location
factor, and state government attitudes fourth. Significantly, labor and utility
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costs, which were not considered important locational factors in research and
development facility siting, were viewed as important for manufacturing.
Another finding of the Malaterre survey was that manufacturing
expansion was planned more frequently on new sites, while research and
development expansion was planned on existing sites. This finding is logical,
given the greater space requirements of manufacturing over research and
development. Table 10 presents siting data.
Table 10
Siting Consideration1
(number of site expansions2)
Purpose Expansion on existing site New site
R&D 17 10
Manufacturing 9 20
Administration 15 9
1 Companies were asked if they were planning a site expansion, on their existing site or on a new
site. The answers were not designed to be exclusive. Thus, a very entrepreneurial company
could perfectly respond that they were planning to expand at their existing site for all purposes, as
well as at a new site for the same reasons.
2Total sample = 40
Source: Malaterre (1993)
Malaterre also found that Massachusetts is ranked by 92% of the
companies as the preferred site for manufacturing siting; however adjoining
states, California, Puerto Rico and foreign countries (Ireland, France) were also
highly rated as potential industrial location choices.
Chapter 2: Industrial Location Theory and
Locational Decision-Making
Why and how firms make the location decisions they do, and what factors
are important determinants of the decision, are the subjects of an extensive
literature of location theory and locational decision-making. The literature can
be divided into three general methodologies, neoclassicist, behavioralist, and
structuralist; the first part of this chapter is a brief description of each. In a
second part, I review studies of the locational decisions of manufacturing firms,
large and small, general and high-technology. The cited studies, while not
exhaustive, provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the locational
decisions of biotechnology firms in Massachusetts, the subject of the third and
final part of this chapter.
METHODOLOGIES
Neoclassicist
Studies employing this methodology are highly quantitative, and follow
the seminal econometric work of Alfred Weber (1929). Weber posited that firms
would locate in response to transport, labor availability and the
advantages/disadvantages of clustering with other industries, at least cost
locations, for assembling raw materials and distributing output. Weber
theorized that if labor productivity gains (savings in labor cost per unit of output)
exceeded the extra transport cost involved, a firm could be attracted to a
different location. He also noted the possibility that agglomeration economies
can lure a firm away from its minimum transport and labor cost location. Weber
considered that these economies (or diseconomies) arose from internal or
external economies of scale, concentration or diffusion of labor skills, selling
and buying patterns, the importance of infrastructure, and rising urban land
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prices (cited by Cooper, 1974).
To explain why economic activity is attracted to certain locations, Hoover
further refined agglomeration into three distinct components: localization,
urbanization, and scale (cited by 0 hUallachbin and Satterthwaite, 1992).
Localization economies are the tendency in some industries for a firm to have
lower costs if located in the same area as others in its industry. Urbanization
economies are the advantages large cities have in infrastructure, available
services, and larger labor markets. Economies of scale lower unit production
costs as the rate of production increases.
Later theorists criticized Weber's assumptions of given production costs,
perfect competition, and given market conditions. Alonso (1964, 1967) showed
that transport costs are not proportional to distance and theorized that the price
of land is the most important determinant of location. He interpreted the
suburbanization of automated manufacturing firms as a Weberian cost-
minimization strategy, but with land price driving the location decision.
Further econometric elaborations in the Weberian tradition, at both the
intrametropolitan and interregional scale, followed. Goldberg (1969) and
Keeble (1984) found that space constraints limit the growth a plant can
experience, and that lack of land availability is usually considered the premier
reason for a firm's relocation. Foster (cited by Pacione, 1985), in a 1972
interregional study, found that labor costs can vary significantly in space and
employers will have to pay more the further they are from labor's residence.
Struyk and James (1975), in an intrametropolitan study, noted that
manufacturing employment exhibits a high degree of mobility; that increased
decentralization was found in manufacturing firms; and that the spatial
clustering of related firms and the employment characteristics of the urban area
influence locational behavior of firms. Czamanski (1974) refined the
agglomeration economies theory by studying industrial clusters. They
developed the argument that major cities derive capital benefits from close
proximity and short linkages between related industries. The main influences
shaping modern location decisions, in their view, are technical and societal
characteristics of the man-made environment (such as what industries are
already present, and what technical competencies exist within them), rather
than physical features like raw material availability or transport costs.
Moriarty (1980) noted the importance of cost of labor and availability of
labor in locational choice. However, Czamanski (1981) asserted that it is not
the cost or availability of labor, but rather the "distribution of skills, productivity
and lack of labor disputes" that is important. Lever (1972) pointed out that the
ultimate rationale in neoclassicist theory is that firms will locate where profits are
highest, and that firms avoid large urban centers where land costs are highest.
Labor costs may be higher away from cities, but more efficient use of labor is
possible there. (In a more recent study, Kowalski and Parakevopoulos (1990)
showed that submarket segmentation, as well, was an important determinant of
land price, as was the land's expressway exposure.)
Wasylenko (1980) found that local property tax differentials were
important determinants of manufacturing relocation. In addition, Mullen and
Williams (1990) note that the educational profile of the workforce can partially
account for labor efficiency growth and thus for interurban variations in
productivity gain.
The costs of land, labor, taxes, and transport-as well as agglomeration
economies associated with industry clustering, infrastructure, and the
educational level, skill, and productivity of labor-all affect the locational
decision. Urban space constraints also play a role. These factors are in
general viewed by the neoclassicists as producing a cost-minimizing location
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result. It should be emphasized here that in the location decision, these factors
typically do not all point in the same direction. For example, economies
associated with skilled labor clustered in an urban setting are typically offset by
higher urban land prices, resulting in a manufacturing move to a suburban
location. However, the localization economies associated with the
biotechnology industry may offset the urban land cost factor. This issue will be
discussed in more detail below. A mixed result, with some biotechnology firms
remaining in urban locations, and others moving to suburban locations, can be
expected, depending on the individual firms' needs and constraints.
Neoclassical factors are not discarded in the theoretical frameworks of the
behavioralists and structuralists that follow, but rather are embedded in them.
Behavioralist
Criticisms of the neoclassicist models of location, viewing an omniscient,
rational "economic man" as an impossible decision-making ideal, resulted in a
series of behavioral studies. Pred (1969) used a behavioral matrix to illustrate
that the better the information that is available and the better the ability to use it,
the more likely the location chosen would be the point of maximum profit.
However, he pointed out that firms work with imperfect information and
information availability. His work was based on that of Simon (1955), who
found that some firms (optimizers) seek to maximize profits, while others
(satisficers) seek to make sufficient profits; and on that of Rawston's (1958)
concept of spatial margin to profitability-the idea that different process
technologies have different cost and revenue structures, which can direct
location. Krumme & Wood (cited by Pacione, 1985) found that firms use little
information in locational choice decision-making. They distinguished between
large and small firms, and noted that large firms do not have to make locational
choices on cost minimization criteria. Cyert & March (1963) took the position
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that multiple business goals exist (particularly in a large organization): growth,
security, risk minimization, entrepreneurial satisfaction, self-preservation, as
well as profit maximization. These goals will affect locational choice, even if full
information is available about a profit-maximizing location. They also found that
social and environmental preferences may weigh more heavily with small firms'
locational decisions than with large ones'. Duncan (cited in Pacione, 1985)
viewed the location decision-making environment in terms of a scale of
increasing uncertainty and risk. The more firms can control external
environmental elements (including price of inputs, products and flow of capital,
labor and land), the more they can reduce the element of risk.
Thus, while acknowledging the neoclassicists' view that factor cost
minimization criteria were important, the behavioralists incorporated the
individual decision makers' values and preferences. At the same time, they
recognized the imperfection of information use, particularly in forecasting the
future.
Structurallist
Massey (1974, 1984) felt that the behavioralists did not take an
adequately wide view of social forces and the macro-economy. As an
alternative approach to neoclassicist theory, Massey's new conceptual view
was that firms are part of a wider societal structure where labor and capital are
in conflict. The firm is not abstracted as a model in itself, but "explanations of
locational change are sought in the structure of the capitalist society in which
the firm works" (Watts, 1987, p. 14). Massey recognized that different types of
firm react in different ways. Large firms create their own distinctive patterns, and
smaller firms react to the existing environment. Bluestone & Harrison (1982)
noted firms were fleeing from unionized areas in the U.S. on a regional level.
Bull (cited by Pacione, 1985) found that suitable labor, premises and relative
accessibility are important, and that most manufacturers rent. Thus, in the short
and medium term, the property available for rent places constraints on
manufacturing. Fothergill & Gudgin (1982), like the neoclassicists Goldberg
and Keeble, also noted spatial constraints on in situ expansion in urban areas,
typically leading to firms leaving urban premises. They also found growth in the
number of multi-plant firms, which are less constrained locationally because
national or international profitability decisions are made outside of existing
locations (for example, decisions are based to some degree on lower tariffs,
access to international markets, and lower factor costs).
Locational studies dealing with capital issues are not numerous, in large
part because of the perception that capital operates in a national market. One,
Estall's 1972 study, showed that venture capital promoted science research and
development in Boston and Philadelphia, however (cited by Watts, 1987).
All three conceptual frameworks deal either explicitly or implicitly with
factor cost minimization, labor force quality, and agglomeration economies.
However, the behavioralists acknowledge the human element of preference
and imperfect use of information, and the structuralists incorporate the firm's
situational dynamics within the macroeconomy-politics or capital market
conditions, for example.
MANUFACTURING LOCATION SEARCH AND DECISION-MAKING
Once a decision to locate a manufacturing plant at a new location has
been made, the subsequent location decision-making process typically
proceeds in three stages, according to Watts (1987). The process is
diagrammed in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. A three-stage industrial location decision sequence. This assumes a
decision to move has already been made, and that a new facility, or relocation
of an existing facility is needed. From Watts (1987).
In this section, I review the literature on the particular factors influencing location
decisions in industry in general, and in high-technology industry. This review
forms the basis of a comparison with the studies of locational factors in the
biotechnology industry cited in Chapter 1.
Location Factors in Industry in General
The manufacturing location search and decision-making processes have
been described by Schmenner (1982), Stafford (1974), and Cooper (1975). In
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a survey of 484 executives, Schmenner found that the location decision was
actually three decisions: whether to add capacity, how to add it (through in situ
expansion, new plant construction or relocation) and where to site. In situ
expansion was preferred because lower costs were associated with it. Both
formal and ad hoc planning for the location decision occurred, with ad hoc
planning most likely in smaller firms, which were also most likely to stay close to
their initial sites.
Schmenner identified six dominant concerns or factors in the decision:
labor costs, labor unionization, proximity to markets, proximity to
suppliers/resources, proximity to other facilities of the company, and an area's
quality of life. Stafford's study also found amenities and personal contacts to be
important in the search, and that firms frequently confined their searches to
areas where they already operated. Thus, Schmenner and Stafford's findings
are consistent with the work of the neoclassicists in their cost and proximity
concerns; of the behavioralists in the importance placed on quality of life,
amenities and personal contacts; and of the structuralists in labor unionization
concerns.
Schmenner also found that different factors were emphasized differently
depending on the scale (i.e. regional, state, or site) of the decision. For
example, he found that taxes had little effect on short-distance movers and land
costs were less important for them as well, compared to long-distance movers.
(See Tables 11, 12, and 13). He also found that 40% of location decisions were
not formally costed out, and that government regulations and their cost, as well
as the retention or attraction of managerial talent, were sometimes neglected in
location decisions.
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Table 11
Constraints on the Region/State Choice: Factors Viewed as "Musts"-All Industries
Factor Percent of Plant Openings Percent of Movers
Citing at Least 1 Factor Citing at Least 1 Factor
Favorable labor climate 76 39
Near market 55 0
Attractive place for engineers/ 35 19
managers to live
Near supplies, resources (includes 31 28
energy
Low labor rates 30 19
Near existing facilities of division/ 25 17
company
Environmental permits 17 8
Facility/land already available 3 6
Better transportation 2 0
Taxes, financing 1 0
Retaining current labor force 0 56
Community attitude 0 3
Source: Schmenner (1982)
Table 12
Constraints on Final Site Selection: Factors Viewed as "Musts"-All Industries
Factor Percent of Plant Openings Percent of Movers
Citing at Least 1 Factor Citing at Least 1 Factor
Rail service 47 25
On expressway 42 31
Special provision of utilities 34 22
(gas, sewerage, water)
Rural area 27 19
Environmental permits 23 3
Within metropolitan area 21 39
On water 16 11
Available land/building 8 11
Transportation (airport 3 3
truck service
Community financing, support 1 0
Proximity to other division plant 1 3
Minimum acreage 1 0
Non-union site 1 0
Source: Schmenner (1982)
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Table 13
Influences on Site Selection: Factors Viewed as "Desirable, if Available"-All Industries
Factor Percent of Plant Openings Percent of Movers
Citing at Least 1 Factor Citing at Least 1 Factor
Favorable labor climate 76 44
Low land costs 60 50
Near markets 42 22
Low taxes 35 19
On expressway 35 28
Rail service 30 22
Low construction costs 29 33
Low wage rates 28 25
College nearby 26 14
Low energy costs 25 14
Government help with roads, 25 3
sewerage, water, labor training
Near suppliers 23 25
Government financing 13 6
Available land/buildings 3 11
Near other division facilities 3 3
Air transportation 1 0
Quality of life 1 0
Retain labor force 0 3
Number of plants citing at least 159 36
one factor
Source: Schmenner (1982)
In addition, Schmenner pointed to the apparent importance of "business
climate", a factor which he described as follows:
I am persuaded that personal preference and "business climate" still
play a role in at least some location decisions. "Business climate"
constantly eludes precise definition because it means different things
to different people, yet for all it remains a rough metric of a location's
expected ability to maintain a productive business climate: the
attitude of working people to hard work, to quality work, to
unionization; the attitude of government to business, as reflected in
government aid in solving joint problems, and in regulations, tax
rates, and financing; the attitude of government in managing itself, its
services, its schools. A location's perceived business climate is
markedly self-perpetuating and hence difficult to turn around, but
there is no doubt that it does exert influence on new plant location
decisions. (Schmenner, 1982, p. 53)
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Schmenner (1982) also found that a variety of organizational forms were
used to make decisions within the firms; most capital-intensive industries are
likely to adopt a centralized large group study, and more entrepreneurial ones a
centralized small group study. In the large group study, the location search is
begun by a senior management committee, and studied by a staff group, which
is taken from various functional areas. In the small group study, the location
search is initiated by the CEO, or by a small group of senior managers; the
analysis here is more informal.
In terms of economic development incentives, Schmenner found that
help on the physical aspects of the site (as opposed to financial aspects) was
highly valued by large manufacturers. Specifically, rapid, accurate information
about potential sites, permitting assistance, and help with infrastructure (roads,
water, sewerage), as well as help with labor training was viewed as desirable.
Schmenner's findings differed somewhat from Rees's and Weinstein's
(1983) finding that economic development assistance has little impact on
locational decisions since most states offer similar packages. 0 hUallachain
and Satterthwaite (1990) also found tax subsidies and issuance of industrial
development bonds to be ineffective in stimulating employment growth;
however university research parks and enterprise zones were useful for
attracting service jobs. They concluded that focused development incentives
that emphasize infrastructure improvement designed for specific industries were
most effective for information-intensive industries, a finding not inconsistent with
Schmenner's.
0 hUallach in's and Satterthwaite's study also confirmed the importance
of localization economies, and wage costs, union strength and labor force
quality as determinants of locational choice. However, unlike Schmenner,
these authors did not find amenities to be important. They noted that
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localization economies, insofar as they concentrate firms, increase the skill
intensity of the local workforce, an important factor in the growth of information-
intensive high-technology firms. These findings are consistent with the
neoclassicists' work cited above.
Location Factors in High-Technology Industry
Premus (1982) looked at the factors influencing the location decisions of
high-technology firms. Tables 14 and 15 show his identifications of the most
important factors in the selection of both the region and a specific site. For the
latter, like Schmenner, Premus found that labor availability is the top concern,
followed by tax structure (in disagreement with Schmenner). Local business
climate, cost of land, transportation accessibility, room for expansion, and a
variety of quality of life measures were ranked next. (Cited in National Council
for Urban Economic Development, 1984).
Table 14
Factors that Influence the Regional Location
Choices of High Technology Companies
Percent rating
Significant or
Rank Locational Attribute Very Significant
1 Labor skills/availability 89%
2 Labor costs 72
3 Tax climate within the region 67
4 Academic institutions 59
5 Cost of living 59
6 Transportation 58
7 Access to markets 58
8 Regional regulatory practices 49
9 Energy costs/availability 41
10 Cultural amenities 37
11 Climate 36
12 Access to raw materials 28
Source: Premus, Robert. Location of High Technology Firms and Regional
Economic Development. Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1982, p. 23.
Cited in National Council for Urban Economic Development (1984).
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Table 15
Factors that Influence the Location Choices of
High Technology Companies Within Regions
Percent rating
Significant or
Rank Locational Attribute Very Significant
1 Availability of workers 96%
2 State and/or local tax structure 86
3 Community attitudes toward business 82
4 Cost of property and construction 79
5 Good transportation for people 76
6 Ample area for expansion 75
7 Proximity to good schools 71
8 Proximity to recreational/cultural opportunities 61
9 Good transportation for materials and products 57
10 Proximity to customers 47
11 Availability of energy supplies 46
12 Proximity to raw materials/supplies 36
Source: Premus, Robert. Location of High Technology Firms and Regional
Economic Development. Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1982, p. 25.
Cited in National Council for Urban Economic Development (1984).
Comparison of Location Factors in Biotechnology, High-
Technology, and General Industry
Table 16 shows a comparison of major site factors influencing location
from Schmenner (all industries), Premus (high-technology companies), and
Malaterre (biotechnology companies; described in Chapter 1). Comparison of
the three lists is complicated by their use of different terms for related concepts
For instance, "state/local tax structure", and "community attitudes towards
business" in the high-technology list correspond most closely with "state
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Table 16
Comparative Site Location Factors
All industries High-tech firms Biotech firms
Schmenner Premus Malaterre
"dominant concerns" "significant" "important"
Labor costs Availability of workers Availability/cost of space for
expansion
Labor unionization State/local tax structure Availability/cost of land
Proximity to markets Community attitudes towards Proximity to firm R&D facility
business
Proximity to suppliers Cost of property and State government attitudes
construction (taxes, financing, regs.)
Proximity to other company Good transportation for Availability/cost of existing
facility people facility
Quality of life Ample area for expansion Labor cost
Proximity to good schools Reasonable cost of living
Proximity to recreational/ Local government attitudes
cultural opportunities (taxes, financing...)
Good transportation for Cost of utilities
materials and products
Proximity to customers Majority of employees live near
site
Availability of energy supplies History of local regulations
Proximity to raw materials/ Infrastructures-transportation
supplies
Proximity to post-high
vocational/technical schools
State/local training programs
Proximity to universities
Proximity to other
manufacturing biotech firms
Proximity to medical
institutions
Cultural facilities
Founder/CEO wanted to live
in the area
Proximity to major customers
government attitudes (taxes, financing, regs.)" and "local government attitudes
(taxes, financing...)" in the biotechnology list. The lists differ in length as well,
ranging from six to twenty items. Still, by lumping some categories and
truncating the longer lists, it is possible to extract six general areas of concern,
and compare the relative importance ascribed to them in the three industry
groupings. The six areas are: labor, taxes, space/land, the structuralist
macroenvironment, clustering of company facilities, and transportation.
Labor concerns, in the form of "labor costs" and "availability of workers",
rank first in importance in the all-industry and high-technology lists, respectively.
Curiously, although they appear (as "labor costs") in the biotechnology list, they
are accorded less relative importance (sixth place). This observation may
underestimate the importance of labor concerns as location factors in
biotechnology, though. The survey did not include labor availability or labor
quality (Malaterre, 1993); industry sources indicate that these considerations
are of primary importance.
A category designated "structuralist macroenvironment", encompassing
labor unionization, as well as community and government attitudes shows up
near the top of each list. It is reasonable to conclude that biotechnology differs
little from industry overall in this concern. On the other hand, taxes evidently are
more of a concern for high-technology and biotechnology than for industry
overall. The reason for this difference is not obvious.
The primary location factor for the biotechnology industry is space/land.
There is a continuum of variation in the relative importance of this factor, which
appears to be moderately important for high-technology firms, and of little
importance for industry overall. The extreme relative importance of the cost and
availability of space and land may be a reflection of two characteristics of the
biotechnology described in Chapter 1: capital constraints (lack of access to
debt financing, and a strong tendency to locate manufacturing plants near the
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(largely urban) research and development facilities.
Proximity to markets and suppliers are key location factors for industry in
general, secondary factors for high-technology industry, but barely mentioned in
the biotechnology list. Presumably, the differences reflect transportation costs.
In the case of the high-technology and, especially, biotechnology industries,
with their relatively low-volume, high-cost supplies and products, transportation
costs are of relatively minor importance.
Interestingly, both the biotechnology industry and industry in general, but
not high-technology industry, ascribe importance to clustering of company
facilities. This tendency is indicated as "proximity to firm R & D facility" in the
biotechnology list, and "proximity to other company facility" in the all-industry
list. The non-appearance of this factor in the high-technology list suggests that
its importance has different sources in the two cases where it does show up. In
the case of industry in general, proximity most likely translates into relatively low
costs for transporting supplies or products between company facilities. In the
case of biotechnology, the industry is new, and the technology rapidly
emerging. Under these circumstances, there is a strong tendency to cluster
where the knowledge is: locating the research and development facilities near
universities and medical centers, and, in turn, locating the manufacturing plants
near the research and development facilities. Proximity, in this case, may
translate into taking advantage of skilled labor and information linkages.
LOCATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
How does the location theory and locational decision-making literature
integrate with what we know about the biotechnology industry, in particular the
biotechnology industry in Massachusetts, as it moves into its manufacturing
phase?
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Neoclassicist Issues
1. Transport costs/Market proximity
Since most Massachusetts firms are in the biotherapeutics segment, in
which both inputs and outputs are generally low volume and high value goods,
transport costs both from suppliers and to final markets should not be a major
cost factor, or an important factor in the manufacturing location decision. The
Malaterre survey indeed indicated this, ranking proximity to major customers
last in its list of manufacturing location factors. (The factor of supplier proximity
was not included in this survey. The factor "infrastructure, transportation" in the
survey does not reveal if transport costs or accessibility to transportation is
intended.) However, specific firms, that have major transport costs associated
with production may n=t locate their manufacturing facilities in Massachusetts.
They may prefer to be located centrally, or near their suppliers; an ag-bio
company which requires proximity to large quantities of corn would be an
example (Webb, 1991). Because the biotechnology industry encompasses
such a wide array of production processes and products, it is difficult to make a
generalization about the importance of supplier/market proximity as location
factors; however, for the biotherapeutics segment, such proximities are not
important in the decision-making process.
2. Labor factors
Given the need for highly skilled and semi-skilled labor by biotechnology
firms, the neoclassicist issue of labor availability is an important location factor.
It was ranked first in the Premus survey of high-technology firms. As discussed
above, it was not directly ranked by Malaterre; however, the factor "majority of
workers live near site" was considered important. Labor quality (concentration
of labor skills and educational profile) is also an important issue for
biotechnology firms, and was indirectly addressed in Malaterre's survey through
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the rankings of the factors "proximity to technical schools" and "state/local
training programs". Labor costs were ranked sixth in importance in the
Malaterre survey; the biotechnology industry would like to minimize labor costs,
given that operating losses are the norm.
3. Agglomeration economies
The biotechnology industry seeks internal economies of scale, as
indicated by its desire for proximity to existing research and development
facilities to aid in manufacturing scale-up processes (Malaterre, 1993). It also
seeks to cluster near related industries: other biotechnology firms, universities,
and medical institutions. The concentration of labor skills, discussed above, is
also a localization economy issue, and an expected location decision factor.
The influence of infrastructure is also significant, since the biotechnology
industry has high water usage rates, particularly in its manufacturing facilities,
and needs a public sewer system for water discharge (Belden, 1993). These
factors would tend to favor urban locations for plant siting.
4. Land
Biotechnology firms view land price and availability as important in the
location decision and some suburbanization of firms has occurred, due to lack
of land availability and higher urban land prices relative to the suburbs
(Rosenberg, 1993). However, the Malaterre survey revealed that in situ
expansion is preferred by biotechnology companies for research and
development and, in turn, proximity to research and development is preferred
for manufacturing. The Malaterre survey ranked the availability and cost of
space and land as primary factors affecting the location decision. Similarly,
Premus viewed the cost of property and construction as important location
factors for high-technology firms overall. Land accessibility (expressway
exposure, for example), aids labor mobility, and may also be a factor in
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biotechnology firms' plant decisions, if a decision to leave an urban location is
made. Premus ranked good transportation, and Malaterre "infrastructures-
transportation", as important site location factors. Parking costs, in addition,
have been taken into account in location decisions (Rosenberg, 1993).
5. Tax climate
Premus ranked state and local tax structure as important high-technology
location factors. Malaterre's survey ranked "state government attitudes (taxes,
financing, regs)" and "local government attitudes (taxes, financing)" as important
manufacturing location factors. If the survey respondents interpreted these
questions primarily as tax cost factors, then the locational paradigms based on
cost minimization have applicability
Behavioralist Issues
1. Preferences
Biotechnology firms view state and local attitudes as important location
factors (Malaterre, 1993). Premus viewed community attitudes towards
business as an important location factor. If these factors are interpreted as state
or local receptivity to biotechnology firms, then some firms may prefer to locate
where such receptivity exists. As the case studies that follow show,
biotechnology firms do view such preference factors as important determinants
of the manufacturing location decision. In addition, Malaterre's finding that 92%
of Massachusetts firms preferred to stay here, and that some founder/CEO's
wanted to live here, supports this view.
2. Other behavioralist issues
Biotechnology companies' use of information and alternative business
goals (other than profit maximization) will be discussed in the case studies and
analysis that follow.
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Structuralist Issues
1. Social forces
Labor unionization is not a factor influencing biotechnology firms. As
noted previously, most biotechnology labor is skilled or semi-skilled, and the
number of manufacturing workers are relatively low (Webb, 1991). Unions have
never been a presence in the Massachusetts biotechnology industry, according
to industry sources.
As previously noted, the political climate at the national, state, and local
levels, can be considered a structuralist issue (Gupta, 1993). The availability of
economic development assistance in Massachusetts, insofar as it reflects the
political nurturing of biotechnology, can also be considered a structuralist issue.
However, an argument can also be made that if economic development
assistance takes the form of financing or infrastructure improvements, these are
factors that reduce costs, and are therefore neoclassicist issues.
2. Capital availability
Capital constraints, particularly the lack of access to debt financing for
small biotechnology firms, can affect those firms' location decisions. Several
studies found financing to be a barrier to growth (Malaterre, 1993; NAIOP,
1992). Biotechnology stock offerings can also be affected by the capital
markets, which in turn can affect whether a manufacturing plant is constructed
or not (Gupta, 1993).
3. Regulations
Federal regulations, which govern the licensing of products and plants,
and local regulations, are part of the structure in which a firm must operate.
FDA regulations, in particular, are viewed by biotechnology firms as a barrier to
growth, because product and plant licensing must occur simultaneously
(Malaterre, 1993). On the other hand, local regulations governing the use of
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recombinant DNA, in the form of zoning or board of health statutes, are seen by
biotechnology companies as indicating a community's suitability as a
manufacturing location (Griffith, 1992).
4. International/national scope
Some Massachusetts biotechnology firms possess international plants,
or are part of a larger, international company. This suggests access to
international markets and other factors affecting international operations may
affect their location decisions.
Summary
Because the biotechnology industry in Massachusetts is a largely urban
and capital-intensive industry, land and space expansion issues are concerns.
Unlike other high-technology firms surveyed, biotechnology firms exhibit a
strong preference for locating manufacturing facilities close to the firms'
research and development facilities. This can be viewed as either a cost-
minimization strategy (if the manufacturing facility can be built as an in situ
expansion), or as a locational economy factor, because of the information-
intensive nature of the biotechnology industry. As I hypothesized, high urban
land prices or rents must be factored against such cost savings or economies by
the biotechnology firms' decision makers. Because of the industry's capital
constraints, state and local economic development financing incentives,
coupled with physical siting assistance, may well be critical location factors.
Tax structure and land accessibility are also expected to be considered in the
location decision.
The behavioralists' studies suggest that large biotechnology firms are
less likely to locate based on strict cost-minimization criteria, but rather based
on other business goals. In part, this is because many have already accessed
the equity capital markets and/or have capital reserves to tap for facility
construction. They may also view the location decision as just one component
of an overall business strategy. In the case studies that follow, some of these
behavioralist issues will be illustrated.
Some Massachusetts biotechnology companies are international in
scope, and possess multiple plants. According to the structuralists' studies, they
may respond locationally to a different set of factors than smaller firms, who may
only operate in the national market. Smaller firms are also more likely to have
difficulty accessing the debt and equity markets; this may affect or constrain their
locational choices.
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Chapter 3: Case Studies
STUDY A: BASF BIORESEARCH CORPORATION
Company Identity
In 1993, BASF Bioresearch Corporation was considered "a department
within a division" of the BASF Group, which is composed of BASF
Aktiengesellschaft and its affiliated companies (350 total), headquartered in
Germany. The BASF Group produced a diversified array of products-
chemicals, oil, gas, agricultural and consumer products-and had over 130,000
employees internationally. The parent company was 127 years old; its U.S.
headquarters was in New Jersey. Chemicals, crop protection products, plastics,
fibers, dyestuffs, finishing products, and consumer products, including
pharmaceuticals, were produced in different U.S. divisions. Over 18,000 BASF
employees worked in the U.S.; 130 were employed by BASF Bioresearch Corp.
in a 39,400 square foot research and development facility in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, conducting pharmaceutical research in oncology and
immunology, using recombinant DNA technology. A 250,000 square foot
combined research and development, administrative, and pilot plant
manufacturing facility was under construction in Worcester, Massachusetts. All
BASF Bioresearch employees expected to be located there in the fall of 1993,
when construction was expected to be completed. It was a mid-size, growing
biotechnology company, anticipating employing 450 people in the year 2000.
Company History
BASF Bioresearch Corporation was started in 1988 because of BASF
AG's desire to get into recombinant DNA research. Its initial location was
planned for Germany; in fact, preliminary engineering was done at a site there.
However, the regulatory environment became restrictive-several federal
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German laws, including the national law on emission standards, were applied
to restrict genetic engineering (recombinant DNA) research, making it "a long
and tedious process," according to Peter Moesta, Vice President of Process
Development and Operations, "to receive permits." Later, in 1989, a German
"Gene Law" was passed, with stringent restrictions governing university as well
as industrial research. This regulatory environment caused the parent company
to evaluate locating such a facility in another country. Research and
development space in Cambridge was leased in 1988. A site in Cambridge
was under serious consideration for purchase in 1989, but liability concerns
arose over possible environmental contamination under an existing industrial
building on the site.
The $90 million facility under construction in 1993 was on a 30-acre
green field, purchased by BASF, in the Massachusetts Biotechnology Research
Park in Worcester. The 75-acre park, dedicated to "growing biotechnology",
was originally state-owned land adjacent to the University of Massachusetts
Medical Center. (45 acres remain in the park, after the 30-acre sale to BASF.)
Ownership of the land passed to the Worcester Business Development
Corporation in 1984, and state and federal economic development funds of
about $3 million have paid for infrastructure improvements at the site. Along
with other companies at the park, BASF has benefitted from the improvements.
In addition, Moesta said, "we requested state assistance to help speed the state
permitting process, (but) it's difficult to know whether two months or six months
were saved by asking... They [the Executive Office of Economic Affairs] are
highly bureaucratic."
The multi-story facility was to be left one-third unfinished in the interior, to
permit future expansion either for additional pilot plant trials (three products will
be tested initially) or for batch production of the final proprietary products. In
1993, approximately 10% of the built-out facility was planned to be dedicated to
administrative functions, 30% to manufacturing, and the rest to research and
development.
Manufacturing Location Decision
According to Moesta, the restrictive German regulatory environment in
1988 triggered an evaluation of where BASF AG wanted to site its bioresearch
facility. Four major criteria were used for the initial global evaluation:
(1) The regulatory environment. In response to its experience in Germany,
BASF excluded other countries (e.g., Switzerland, Denmark) from
consideration because of restrictions on recombinant DNA research. This
level of restriction did not exist in the United States.
(2) Scientific environment. An attempt was made to evaluate quality of science
in various countries. University rankings, numbers of Ph.D.'s, literature
citations, Nobel laureates, and federal support of science were used as
quantitative measures. (Some of these measures turned out not to be
quantitatively meaningful, however. "How do you measure the scientific
contribution of an 89 year-old Nobel laureate?" Moesta asked.) U.S.
science was considered of the highest quality.
(3) Proximity to major markets. The U.S. was the second largest market for the
BASF group. It contained company production and marketing facilities, but
no research facilities of any type. BASF wanted to diversify its research and
development effort out of Germany and into this major market. "The [U.S.]
regional marketing head had a lot of power in the decision," according to
Moesta.
(4) Communication to Germany. The western U.S. was excluded because the
time differences between German headquarters and California meant
company colleagues could not be reached during office hours.
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The result of this evaluation was that the eastern U.S. was considered the
appropriate global choice.
A regional evaluation was then performed on five areas: Greater Boston,
New Jersey, Greater Washington DC, Philadelphia, and Raleigh, NC. It was
based on:
(1) Regulatory environment. All five areas had similar regulatory environments.
(2) Scientific environment. Boston had the highest scores in "cutting edge,
basic discovery science," according to Moesta.
(3) Availability of staff.
(4) Access to Frankfurt, Germany. An international airport within a one hour
drive was considered a necessity.
(5) Overall business environment. This category included taxes, wages, and
utility costs. Moesta said the Boston area fared second worst in this
category, but "you pay what you have to pay", for labor, for example. He
also said a tax analysis was completed on each area.
A qualitative scoring system was set up; it resulted in Greater Boston scoring
highest, primarily because of the strength of its scientific environment. The final
level of site selection involved the following criteria:
(1) Local support. The Worcester site had local support through the way in
which it was created and through local zoning ordinances.
(2) Availability of water and sewer.
(3) Proximity to universities and other biotechnology companies.
(4) Permits already in place.
(5) Transportation accessibility for employees (road, rail, and air).
(6) Attractiveness of site.
(7) Cost of living for employees.
Moesta said land and building costs were not an issue, but could have become
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one. He mentioned that the construction is within schedule and on budget, and
that the site purchase price was less than those of alternative sites reviewed.
About 50 sites were looked at, using a commercial broker. About five or six
were seriously considered, although none was explicitly costed out. "We view
this as an investment," Moesta said.
General Business Strategy
BASF was pursuing a capital investment strategy. Backward vertical
integration, from research and development through pilot plant and small
manufacturing, and proximity to the U.S. market, were goals to be furthered by
locating its biotechnology company in Massachusetts.
Financing
The construction was financed through earnings of the parent company.
STUDY B: GENZYME CORPORATION
Company Identity
In 1993, Genzyme Corp. was a top-tier "health care products" company,
with four primary business areas: biotherapeutics, diagnostic services,
diagnostic products, and pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals. It had over 1500
employees in four locations. Its 86,000 square foot headquarters provided
administrative, research and development, and diagnostic product
manufacturing facilities, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. A second Cambridge
location provided 21,000 square feet of manufacturing space. It leased a
120,000 square foot manufacturing plant in Framingham, where three products,
including Ceredase, its proprietary biotherapeutic, were produced using
conventional extraction methods. In addition, for process engineering and pilot
plant capacity, two other Framingham buildings were leased, making a total of
233,000 square feet in Framingham. Generic pharmaceuticals were produced
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at two locations in the U.K. A true bio-manufacturing facility of 130,000 square
feet was under construction in Allston, Massachusetts, where genetically
engineered Ceredase was planned for production in 1994, assuming FDA
approval. Ceredase was an enzyme used to treat Gaucher's disease.
Genzyme was a growing company, with 200 employees to be added in 1993;
550 were added in 1992. In 1993, in Massachusetts, 705 employees worked
for Genzyme, 212 of them in manufacturing. In its biotherapeutics division
alone, nine products were in the production pipeline in 1993.
Company History
Genzyme was founded in 1981 in Massachusetts by a Tufts Medical
School professor, whose goal was to develop diagnostic enzyme products.
With $3 million in venture capital, he and CEO Henri Termeer, who was hired in
1983, set up a parallel business strategy (Rossi, 1993). First, to generate near-
term revenues, products-enzymes, assays, reagents used in diagnostic tests,
and fine chemicals-were produced at a small manufacturing plant purchased
in the U.K. While generating revenues in this way, the company pursued
research work in genetically-engineered biotherapeutics. (Recombinant
Ceredase has been in product development since 1981). The first space used
by the company was leased research space in Boston's Chinatown, adjacent to
Tufts. Later, in 1989, the company leased its headquarters space in
Cambridge, at One Kendall Square. In 1990, it leased additional space in a
separate building at that address.
In 1992, as noted above, additional space was leased in Framingham. In
1991, however, plans were made to locate a manufacturing facility in Allston.
This facility would include large scale bioreactors for mammalian cell culture,
protein purification suites, sterile filling operations, and laboratory space. It was
expected to be completed in 1993, with validation and start-up in 1994. In the
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long-term, consolidation of the company's Cambridge headquarters operations
and Framingham manufacturing operations was planned for the Allston site.
The $100 million, multi-story facility lay on 3 acres controlled by Genzyme under
a 60 year ground lease from the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. An
additional 6.4 acres was also ground-lease controlled provided that specified
expansion requirements were met. Base rents would vary depending on
whether the portion was developed or in holding status. Genzyme was
planning a staged, multi-year build-out, to a maximum of 800,000 square feet
(see Table 17). One-half of the plant's capacity was to be geared toward
production of recombinant Ceredase and of Thyrogen, a thyroid-stimulating
hormone; subcontracting to other manufacturers was considered possible for
the remainder of the plant's capacity. Previous site uses were as an abattoir
and, later, as a Conrail railroad yard.
Table 17
Term:
Area:
Rent:
Minimum building are
Minumum build-out t
retain land:
Maximum build:
Genzyme's Ground Lease Terms with
the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
60 years, renewable
9.4 acres, approximately
$0.50/sq. ft., until occupancy permit
$1.80/sq. ft. of building area on first 2.5 acres$1.60/sq. ft. of additional building area
Rest adjusted by CPI every 5 years
Maximum CPI - 6%, minumum -3%
a: 1.3 FAR for 1st 160,000 sq. ft.
1.6 thereafter
2.0 is maximum FAR
0
80,000 sq. ft commenced within 8 months
280,000 within 5 years
380,000 within 7.5 years
480,000 within 10 years
Additional 100,000 sq. ft. every 3 years
800,000 sq. ft.
Source: Genzyme
Manufacturing Location Decision
David J. McLachlan, Chief Financial Officer and senior vice president,
said the location decision was made in two stages: a look at twelve different
states across two major criteria, then a focus on Massachusetts and sites within
Massachusetts. The twelve states (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Texas) were qualitatively selected for one or
more of three major reasons: they were in New England, known for
concentration of biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms, or known low tax cost
states. A tax analysis and permitting analysis were performed for all twelve
states, and the states ranked. The key criteria for ranking were:
" whether the state had a corporate income tax
" geographic distribution of sales
. whether the state allowed nowhere sales
- weighting of sales in a state's income sourcing formula
- personal property tax exemptions for manufacturing machinery and
equipment
" real property tax rates.
Based on these criteria, Massachusetts ranked fifth out of twelve, and first
among the New England states. The permitting analysis revealed no major
differences among the states.
McLachlan said, "We didn't want to go too far. It became a risk issue-
we had never built [such a plant] before and had no idea of hiring...it is not
routinized. But, we wanted a proactive response [from state and local
governments]. In Rhode Island and North Carolina we took tours, met the
governors.. .we didn't get a response from Weld until we announced we were
going to North Carolina. He was in our office the next day, with economic
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development officials. We wanted a public, pro-business commitment."
Using a real estate developer, Genzyme's site selection process in
Massachusetts narrowed to four sites: Boston (Allston), Cambridge, Worcester,
and Shrewsbury. All but Shrewsbury were formally costed out, both in terms of
operating costs and capital costs. Other criteria-permitting, biotechnology
zoning, expansion capacity, public transportation, economic development
grants (both local and state), and "public presences"-were evaluated as well.
A concern in 1993 was the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority's water
rates, which were expected to increase. This increase was not expected at the
time the alternative operating budgets were developed.
The key cost difference between the Allston site and the others was a
Chapter 121A agreement which provided for a stable 15-year payment in lieu of
property taxes. The value of this tax difference between Boston and the other
alternatives was approximately $2 million. In addition, "the state, Boston
Redevelopment Authority, and turnpike all worked together so that we had all
state and local construction permits (32 in all) in 60 days," according to
McLachlan. An additional $3 million in state landscaping funds and a $100,000
state training grant were to be used at the site, and the City of Boston promised
traffic improvements. According to McLachlan, they were currently negotiating
for the Turnpike Authority to pick up the costs of the Environmental Impact
Statement on the undeveloped portion of the site. The construction was slightly
behind schedule (about 6 weeks), and there were cost overruns because of
engineering problems. However, McLachlan said, "our Chairman is European;
he lives and works in the city and wants to have political influence by being in
Boston. [He] wants influence to try to shape the biotechnology industry in
Massachusetts."
General Business Strategy
McLachlan noted that the general strategy of Genzyme was risk
minimization, not cost minimization, with "the goal of becoming a diversified,
fully integrated health care products manufacturer and marketer."
Financing
Genzyme had had a total of eight financings since its inception. The
money used to finance the Allston manufacturing facility was $100 million of
convertible subordinate debentures at 6.75%. The company had other public
stock offerings in 1986 and 1989. It also raised $47 million through two off-
balance sheet limited partnerships and had created two separate public
companies, as multi-product funding vehicles.
The company had been marginally profitable, showing a profit
intermittently over the last five years. Net losses in 1992 were attributable to
special charge-offs.
STUDY C: ALPHA-BETA TECHNOLOGY
Company Identity
In 1993, Alpha-Beta Technology was a mid-size biotechnology company
with headquarters and approximately 90 employees in two buildings in
Worcester's Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Park, where it conducted
research and development, as well as pilot plant trials for its carbohydrate-
based therapeutics, in approximately 40,000 square feet of leased space. It
was constructing a manufacturing facility of 50,000 square feet in Smithfield,
Rhode Island for Phase III clinical trials and commercial production of
Betafectin, its first product based on a novel carbohydrate polymer, which was
to be used to treat infections.
Alpha-Beta's focus was on carbohydrates, P-glucans and "the company's
patent portfolio include[d] key technology relating to the p-glucan receptor on
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certain white blood cells and the ability of carbohydrate compounds to target
this receptor and treat diseases of the immune system." (Company annual
report, page 4). Seven p-glucan-related products were in various stages of
product development. Betafectin, a biotherapeutic used to treat wound
infections, was closest to commercialization. The company was growing, with
265 employees expected to be employed by the year 2000, and 40-50 hired in
1993 alone.
Company History
The company was founded in 1988 by two M.I.T. doctoral graduates, who
remained as company owners in 1993. It originally located its administrative
and research and development facility in Worcester because the Massachusetts
Biotechnology Research Park provided it with inexpensive "incubator" space
there, at a reasonable rent. It had also received its seed venture capital of
$350,000 from an on-site venture capital firm. (Other benefits at Massachusetts
Biotechnology Research Park are described under BASF above).
In 1992, Alpha-Beta expanded into 10,000 square feet at a separate
address in the park (Two Biotech) for early stage pilot plant operations. In early
1992, the owners recognized the need for a Phase IlIl clinical trial and product
manufacturing plant for Betafectin. In order to ensure control of the proprietary
process technology, they did not consider licensing the manufacture to another
company, but rather preferred to vertically integrate. The $38 million Smithfield
plant under construction in 1993 was planned to be dedicated to commercial
manufacturing after successful completion of Phase Ill trials, expected in mid-
1994.
Manufacturing Location Decision
According to D. Davidson Easson, a company co-founder and executive
vice president, and Braden Bohrmann, the company's chief financial officer, the
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initial criterion for the location decision was proximity (within a one-hour drive of
the Worcester headquarters). Although a geographic radius within a one-hour
drive encompassed five New England states, only Massachusetts and Rhode
Island were seriously considered as possible sites. An accounting firm
completed a tax analysis, comparing various tax costs, short- and long-term, of
building in Massachusetts or Rhode Island. "But, the results of the tax analysis
really didn't matter; the financing deal really drove the decision," said
Bohrmann. At about the same time, according to Easson, economic
development officials in Rhode Island were approached, with the result that
Rhode Island Port Authority industrial revenue bonds were offered by that state
to finance 80% of the manufacturing facility construction, at 9.5% for 20 years.
This proposal compared favorably with a more complex, less certain financing
arrangement offered by the Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Park (see
Table 18). Thus, the facility financing arrangement became the main driving
force behind the choice of state location.
Table 18
Massachusetts- Rhode Island Proposal
Massachusetts(Worcester Business
Development Corp.)
Comparison
Rhode Island
Loan amount:
Equity contribution:
Credit enhancement:
Structure:
Warrants:
Expected rate:
Term:
Lease vs. loan:
Fixed
Uncertain
H.U.D. 108
Complex
No
10%
Uncertain
Lease
Flexible
20%
RI Moral Obligation
Proven
Yes, but nominal
10%
20 years
Option
Source: Alpha-Beta Technology
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Within Rhode Island, three sites were reviewed, two intensively. These
two were costed out for construction. The main site criteria were:
- availability of skilled workforce/labor rates
- taxes
- utility rates
" expansion capability
- regulatory environment.
The local community had biotechnology regulations in place. The chosen site
also offered easy access to a major state highway, Route 146, and had public
utilities available. It was also part of an incipient biotechnology industrial park,
with one other occupant at the time. According to Easson, proximity to other
biotechnology companies was a desirable factor. The other site under serious
consideration had possible environmental engineering problems; however, it
would have been eligible for the industrial bond financing as well, had it proven
acceptable.
The specific incentives offered by Rhode Island to induce Alpha-Beta to
locate its manufacturing facility there were: the state's acquiring the site,
building the facility on a turnkey basis, on 20 acres; providing the company with
an option to purchase an additional 10 acres; floating the taxable bonds to
finance the facility, as noted above; and providing credit enhancement through
Sumitomo Bank for the bonds (which were Rhode Island moral obligation
bonds). Job-training assistance was also offered by Rhode Island, and property
tax concessions were negotiated by the state with Smithfield.
General Business Strategy
Alpha-Beta wanted to maintain the lead in carbohydrate-based
biotherapeutics, and to retain world-wide manufacturing rights to all its
pharmaceutical products. Bohrmann said, "The strategy [to acquire and build
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the facility] had two parts: to find the available financing, and then to defer the
cash obligation...Our 20-year amortization period with Rhode Island was an
exercise in risk management. The only reason why we are in Rhode Island is
because we were enticed there by cheap financing. We intend to expand our
research and development [and other functions] in Worcester. We now have an
even better deal from the research park and state of Massachusetts, which
includes the state's Emerging Technology Fund, H.U.D. Section 108 monies
and a Chapter 121A tax agreement."
Thus, Alpha-Beta did not plan to consolidate its functions in Rhode
Island, but rather to maintain and expand its headquarters in Massachusetts,
"because that's where our labor base is," according to Bohrmann. Only the
commercial manufacturing activities of the company were considered likely to
be expanded in Rhode Island.
Financing
The company's approximately $7-8 million portion of the facility
investment was financed through an initial public offering in late 1992. The
remainder of the facility financing is described above.
STUDY D: COMPANY X
Company Identity
In 1993, Company X was a top-tier biotechnology firm specializing in
using recombinant DNA/genetic engineering technology to create genetically
altered proteins for use as human therapeutic agents. It had 770 employees
(595 technical-including approximately 200 in manufacturing and quality
assurance-and 175 administrative) at four locations: a 190,000 square foot
corporate headquarters and discovery research facility in Cambridge, a
210,000 square foot product development and manufacturing plant in Suburbia,
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Massachusetts, and branch offices in Tokyo and Paris. It was a growing
company; 100 employees were added in 1992.
Company History
Company X was founded in 1980 by two Harvard professors. One
founder remained on the Board of Directors in 1993. It originally rented space
in Boston from a medical institution for a research and development facility. It
considered itself a "research boutique", using recombinant DNA technology to
clone and manufacture purified proteins, which would be used to treat human
diseases. Its intention was to "forward integrate" in this area, according to the
company vice president of manufacturing. In 1984, it purchased its
headquarters building in Cambridge, and later rented the building next door to
this facility. Administrative, research and development, and a small
GMP-capable pilot plant were all located in Cambridge. In 1986, the company
purchased a 51 acre site in Suburbia, Massachusetts, which contained an
instrumentation lab building on the site. This two-story, 186,000 square foot
building was retrofitted and expanded. The retrofitting was "a very costly
process, which we would probably not repeat," according to the vice president,
to accommodate product development laboratories and manufacturing facilities.
The retrofitted (and slightly expanded) building was 206,000 square feet in
area; approximately 30,000 square feet of this space was taken up by four
independent manufacturing suites. A master plan for the Suburbia site,
showing a build-out of 1 million square feet, received local approval in 1989-90.
The company's pilot plant manufacturing capacity was moved from
Cambridge to Suburbia; however, the company headquarters, and research
and development ("discovery research") divisions were maintained in
Cambridge. As well, an additional research and development building of
43,000 square feet in Cambridge was purchased from a now defunct
67
biotechnology company in late 1992 for $10 million.
Research scientists were left in Cambridge, "for cultural reasons,"
according to the vice president. "We figured they would be happier there."
The $50 million Suburbia facility in 1993 was undergoing an expansion
for a 113,000 square foot preclinical research and development building and
42,000 square foot energy plant. These additions were valued at $55 million.
The Suburbia manufacturing facility ran two full-time shifts and one "lightly
staffed shift" to produce bulk protein for shipment to a California "finish and fill"
plant, under a licensing agreement with a major pharmaceutical company. The
bulk protein was sold to the pharmaceutical company for final sterile
manufacture and distribution. Four other products were licensed to other
companies for manufacture and sale. Five others were being produced at the
Suburbia plant in small quantities for preclinical trial use.
Manufacturing Location Decisions
The vice president was not familiar with the factors or processes involved
in this decision. He said the company wanted "to maintain a Massachusetts
presence." The Suburbia site was a 20 minute drive from the company
headquarters, and close to Interstate 495. Approximately 450 people were
employed there. The workforce was predominantly semi-skilled and skilled.
A real estate specialist with the company discussed the reasons for
selecting the Suburbia site for manufacturing in 1986. According to the
specialist, the high cost and lack of land availability in Cambridge were major
factors for looking outside Cambridge. Only in-state sites were considered.
Three sites in Massachusetts were formally costed out. Factors considered in
the location decision were:
- cost of land
- nature of land availability. Two sites were for sale; one for lease; and all had
68
existing buildings.
" transportation accessibility. The ease and directness of the commute from
Cambridge headquarters were considered. All sites under evaluation had
access to Route 2, Route 128, or Interstate 495.
* qualities of the site itself. Available infrastructure (water, sewer, power, road
systems) was evaluated.
" local receptivity, both in terms of the existence of local recombinant DNA
regulations and positive reception from local government and business
leaders.
- expansion capabilities. Both the amount of land available and nature of
existing on-site building (an instrumentation lab), in the case of Suburbia,
provided opportunities for building expansion.
" attractiveness of site.
The real estate specialist said, "Labor cost and availability issues were
not major factors because of proximity to existing company facilities." The
Suburbia site chosen was not the least cost site, based on the operating or
capital cost budgeting, "which turned out not to be realistic anyway." Qualitative
factors played a role in the decision, primarily the perception that it was the best
commute for existing staff, local community receptivity, and site attractiveness. It
was a wooded, campus-like setting. Interestingly, the original intention was to
look for a three, five, or ten-acre site, not a site as large as that in Suburbia;
however, its expansion potential and availability for purchase (which was
deemed preferable to a leasehold) tipped the scales in its favor.
No economic development assistance was requested from the state.
"The state business climate [during the Dukakis administration] was not as.
receptive as it is now," according to the real estate specialist. Nor were any tax
or utility rate negotiations conducted with Suburbia or utility companies. In-
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house staff was used for cost evaluation, with the help of a commercial broker.
Future Manufacturing Plant Siting
According to the vice president, the company was considering adding
additional manufacturing capacity within the next two years. An 80,000 square
foot, $60 million shell would be constructed, to include warehousing, quality
control assurance facilities, and labs, as well as manufacturing capacity. The
intention was to build out the space over 10 years. The exact square footage to
be dedicated to manufacturing was unknown in 1993.
The manufacturing location decision became a question of whether to
expand at Suburbia or to go off-shore to Puerto Rico or Ireland to: (1) take
advantage of tax incentives offered in these locations; (2) help establish an
international market presence (in the case of Ireland, in the European market);
(3) enter a different regulatory environment; and (4) avoid "disaster issues" (not
having all manufacturing capacity at one location, in case it is destroyed by a
natural disaster. The vice president said, "we have to think of ourselves as
more mature than we really are" because of the long product-to-market cycle.
Ultimately, the Board of Directors tentatively agreed to proceed with near-
term expansion at Suburbia for the following reasons:
* the flexibility of the site for phased development. The master plan had already
been designed to build out an expanded manufacturing capacity, and the site
characteristics supported a highly interactive company culture-"internal
synergies," according to the vice president.
" the Suburbia regulatory experience. The company had a consistent record
with local review and approval authorities and understood the timelines and
requirements of the development process in Suburbia. Also, ELA approval
had already been received in December 1992.
" start-up timing. The master plan and facilities infrastructure (water, sewer,
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road, etc.) were already in place, which would reduce time to build the facility
and allow central facilities to be used. The company already had a track
record of development at the Suburbia site and understood the site's history
and characteristics.
- Suburbia's "climate"/local receptivity. The community had consistently
supported and worked with the company and had a track record with the
company and with the biotechnology industry.
Other issues considered in reaching this decision were: (1) The importance of
the research/manufacturing linkage at initial commercialization and scale-up of
a product. Such a linkage speeds up commercialization. The technical
personnel can iron out "bugs" in the scale-up process. (More routine
manufacturing can occur in off-shore locations where the need for technical
adjacency is not so necessary, but first manufacturing was emphasized on-site.)
(2) The presence of local expertise in both biotechnology and biotechnology
facility construction. (3) Awareness that other communities might be hostile to
biotechnology companies.
The vice president noted that the siting decision alternatives were not
formally costed out; however, a cost estimate was prepared for the the proposed
Suburbia expansion, and a consultant's help was used to reach the decision,
"which was based on [the] qualitative reasons [mentioned above]."
General Business Strategy
The vice president said, "We like to hedge our bets, but we consider
ourselves an entrepreneurial growth company, which is risk-minimizing." The
company had a variety of product licensing agreements and joint ventures with
"heavy-weight" partners. As noted above, eleven different proprietary protein
products were in licensing agreements or clinical trials. Five distinct research
programs were being conducted. Over the long-term, the strategy was to
become fully integrated, pursuing "global product development and
establishing world-wide commercialization capabilities."
Financing
The company had two stock offerings in the 1980's. As a result of
unsuccessful patent litigation, it was unable to manufacture one product, and,
as a consequence, was acquired by a large health products company in 1992.
The alliance gained Company X new capital of over $300 million, which
permitted it to pursue its expansion plans. To date, the health products
company has allowed Company X autonomy in its major investment decisions.
STUDY E: BIOGEN
Company Identity
In 1993, Biogen was a top-tier "biopharmaceutical company principally
engaged in developing and manufacturing drugs for human health care through
genetic engineering" (1992 Biogen Annual Report, p. 16). It had 360
employees in five leased locations totalling 198,000 square feet in Cambridge,
all clustered in the Kendall Square area (see Table 19). Approximately 45,000
square feet of this space was dedicated to pilot plant manufacturing or bulk
manufacturing. Five of its products were on the market, sold internationally
through licensees (one was a hepatitis diagnostic, the others were
biotherapeutics). Its sole agricultural product, porcine somatotropin, was
awaiting U.S.D.A. approval. Five additional products were at the pre-clinical or
clinical testing stage, including Hirulog, which controls blood clotting through
thrombin regulation, and p-interferon, a potential hepatitis and multiple sclerosis
antiviral treatment. Biogen was a growing company, expecting to add
approximately 70 employees (expanding its existing workforce by 20%) in
1993-94.
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Table 19
Biogen Real Estate
Site Square feet Use
14 Cambridge Center 67,000 R & D, manufacturing
241 Binney Street 54,000 Process development
Quality control
345 Vassar Street 26,000 R&D
4 Cambridge Center 34,000 Office
190 Fifth Street 17,000 Warehousing
198,000
12 Cambridge Center 130,000 R & D, Office
Source: Biogen
Company History
Biogen was founded in 1978 by Walter Gilbert, a Harvard professor and
Nobel laureate, and six other scientists, including some Europeans. Its original
place of founding was Geneva, Switzerland; however, it had always had a
Massachusetts research presence, because of Dr. Gilbert. Since 1980, it had
leased lab space in Kendall Square, initially approximately 30,000 square feet.
An initial public offering in 1983 raised $58 million. "The approach to research
was a shotgun approach [in agriculture, chemicals, and biotherapeutics],"
according to James Mullen, Vice President of Operations, "and, as a
consequence, Biogen teetered on the edge of bankruptcy until [current
chairman and CEO] James Vincent was hired in 1985."
Vincent focused the company's mission on biotherapeutics and it
remained focused on molecular biology and protein-based products. He sold
the Geneva plant in 1987 and consolidated research and development in
Cambridge in that year, when the company was reincorporated in
Massachusetts.
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The company's major source of revenues became royalties from its
licensees, who sold products based on Biogen-developed technology, primarily
ox-interferon and hepatitis B products. Bulk manufacturing was limited to one
location, 14 Cambridge Street, where two products were produced for sale to
licensees for final finish and fill prior to marketing. This facility was leased, like
the others, but "with option to purchase, because of the manufacturing,"
according to Mullen.
In 1993, with five products in the pipeline, expansion plans were
contemplated for additional research and development, office, and
manufacturing space. Since the company had been profitable since 1989,
flexibility was desired to be able to forward integrate into commercial
manufacturing, for in-the-pipeline proprietary products.
A $35 million, 135,000 square foot facility for offices and research and
development in Cambridge at 12 Cambridge Center, adjacent to the company's
existing facilities at 14 Cambridge Center, was planned, with construction to
start in the fall of 1993. Purchase of the land for this, and a five-year, renewable
option to purchase nearby parcels, totalling approximately six acres (for an
additional 600,000 square feet of space for manufacturing as well as other
functions), was part of the arrangement. The parcels were originally part of a
late 1960's urban renewal area in East Cambridge, assembled for a NASA
Space Center, and title was held by the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority.
Prior uses in the area included both heavy and light industry.
Manufacturing Location Decision
The current decision to locate an additional 135,000 square feet (and,
possibly, 600,000 square feet more) was not strictly a manufacturing location
decision, but rather was driven by the need for research and development and
office space first, with long-term manufacturing use incorporated into the
planning. Mullen said, "we have chosen to put in manufacturing capacity late
[relative to other companies], in late Phase II or early Phase Ill trials... I've seen
five companies [forced to] walk away when manufacturing capacity was
constructed too early; then product approvals did not come through at all, or not
on time.
"We also plan on making bulk pharmaceuticals [via fermentation,
purification, and recovery] and subcontracting out the final formulation and
filling, since there is no competitive advantage for us [to perform sterile fill and
finish]." Mullen also noted the difficulties in pre-planning for manufacturing
space and capacity. "Right up the the end [of the regulatory process] you have
three unknown variables, the dosage, the size of the market, and the
technological process. For example, we have had a tenfold increase in
efficiency in producing one product [now at Phase Ill pilot plant stage]." Thus,
the space requirements for production have been reduced, and an existing
research and development floor could be converted for commercial production.
In one case, the pilot plant area was successfully converted to commercial
production.
When trying to locate for its upcoming expansion, Mullen said, Biogen
performed a national review of regions, "based on the availability of skilled
labor in both pharmaceutical research and pharmaceutical manufacturing.
However, research quality [represented in the workforce] drove the decision."
Five areas (outside of Cambridge) were qualitatively evaluated:
- New Jersey/Philadelphia
- North Carolina Research Triangle
. Chicago
. Greater Denver
. San Francisco Bay
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These areas were considered based on Mullen's knowledge and experience of
where pharmaceutical research concentrations existed, as well as by talking
with companies who had located in them. Puerto Rico was not considered
because it was considered "too remote, culturally different, and the whole tax
code [in terms of tax incentives there] is under attack," according to Mullen.
New Jersey and San Francisco were discarded as choices because the
cost of living and doing business in these locations was considered
prohibitively high, although the labor pool was large in both areas. Chicago
"was not considered an attractive locale" by any of the decision-makers,
according to Mullen, and Denver did not have a large enough labor pool,
although costs were lower. North Carolina had a sufficient labor pool, ample
land, low land and construction costs, as well as a low cost of living and a
positive regulatory and business climate. A site was identified in North Carolina
and formally costed out, while concurrent negotiations were ongoing with the
Cambridge Redevelopment Authority and Boston Properties, which had site
control at 12 Cambridge Center. A commercial broker was used in the
negotiations; internal staff developed the cost alternatives.
Despite a 40% cost premium at the Cambridge location over the North
Carolina site, Mullen said, "we decided we didn't have enough critical mass, not
enough people, to be able to relocate some [to North Carolina]. Proximity [to
existing facilities] was an issue and there were hidden expenses in trying to
manage two [disparate] locations... management control issues led to the
decision to stay in Massachusetts."
Biogen was hoping for a 121 A tax agreement for a stable 15-year
property tax payment to the City of Cambridge, and zoning variances to permit
manufacturing use and some dimensional changes at 12 Cambridge Center.
Mullen said the local and state political reception has been helpful and positive,
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since relocation to North Carolina was discussed as a possibility.
Manufacturing capacity decisions were to be made in 12 to 24 months.
General Business Strategy
Risk minimization and growth management, to develop a vertically
integrated, global company presence were key components of Biogen's
business strategy.
Financing
Construction of the new facility was to be financed through company
earnings. Biogen had been profitable for the last four years, as noted above.
Mortgage financing was to be used as the permanent financing vehicle.
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Chapter 4: Analysis
The data gathered in the case studies is analyzed in this chapter using
the concepts developed in Chapter 2. The data from the interview protocol of
Appendix A were summarized, insofar as possible, in a matrix form (Appendix
C). Common and disparate elements of neoclassic, behavioralist and
structuralist theory, as well as comparisons of individual firms' decision-making
are discussed below.
All five companies surveyed were high growth biotherapeutics firms
which had multiple products in research and development and product
development nearing commercialization. Three companies were at the
commercialization stage. All had been established within the last 15 years
(BASF's parent company was considerably older, though). Three companies
were not profitable, one was intermittently profitable, and one had shown profits
consistently over the last four years. All were publicly held, had urban
headquarters in Massachusetts cities, and had made or were planning a
manufacturing location decision. Four of the five had an historical, academic
connection with the Boston area. The founder or founders were professors or
had trained in local universities. All desired vertical integration, perceived
growth and capacity management as issues, and most viewed risk-minimization
as a primary company goal. All companies were developing proprietary
products.
INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES' LOCATION DECISIONS
BASF Bioresearch Corporation
The method used to make the location decision was systematic, and
conducted on three scales-international, national, and local. Cost
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minimization was explicitly discounted as a major decision criterion. However,
labor availability and skill intensity were the two most thoroughly researched
location factors. These are neoclassicist issues. Structuralist concerns were
apparent in the company's sensitivity to the regulatory environment, the result of
BASF's history of excessive regulation in Germany. However, BASF's ability to
exploit economic development assistance was limited.
Proximity to a major market, a neoclassicist issue, was a distinguishing
feature of the location decision. However, the choice of the U.S. was in part a
preference of an influential company executive, a behavioralist issue.
Moreover, in the final site selection, preference factors, such as local support
and site attractiveness, played a role. Planning for the decision was ad hoc,
with corporate control of the decision, and with major consultant input.
Genzyme Corporation
The location decision was conducted at two scales, across states and
within Massachusetts. Comparative regional cost issues and comparative
regulatory climates (neoclassicist and structuralist issues) were carefully
evaluated by outside consultants. The political climate (a structuralist issue)
was a dominant concern, and the company not only gauged it to ascertain state
and local receptivity (behavioralist issues), but also exploited it actively to
garner help with both implicit and explicit costs (neoclassicist issues), through
permitting speed, site expansion flexibility, and tax concessions.
Cost factors at three sites were compiled and evaluated; operating cost
differences were not found to be substantially different among the sites, with the
inclusion of the Chapter 121 A tax payments at the Boston location. Most
significantly, the CEO's strong preference for a highly visible public presence in
Boston played a determining role in the locational decision (a behavioralist
issue). Availability of capital (a structuralist issue) was not a major issue, since
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the ability to arrange financing was a company strength.
Alpha-Beta Technology
The location decision was driven by cost-led neoclassicist issues, on
both the state and local scales. Lack of capital and the political climates of both
Massachusetts and Rhode Island (structuralist issues) were major contributing
factors in the location decision. Although financial risk management was a
stated strategy, cost minimization apparently was the overriding goal.
Company X
The two major location decisions, whether to move to Suburbia in 1986
and then, whether to expand manufacturing there in 1993 and forward, were
based on different criteria. The first was cost-led, based on the neoclassicist
issues of land price and availability, but costs in the end did not determine the
final location, but rather site preference (a behavioralist issue), based on ease
of commute (not distance from Cambridge), site attractiveness, and local
receptivity. To some degree, structuralist issues were ignored, since no
proactive economic development was requested, and capital issues were not a
stated concern.
The 1993 in situ expansion plans were more directly preference-based; a
risk minimization strategy was preferred over a cost minimization strategy. The
company's sensitivity to the larger political climate had increased (a structuralist
issue). The company intended to negotiate some infrastructure and tax
concessions from the state and Suburbia.
Biogen
The location decision was made on two scales, across specific states,
and then between one local and one out-of-state site. The initial state
selections were based on general industry knowledge, and the specific site
comparison was quantitative. Comparative site costs (neoclassic issues) were
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evaluated. Biogen decided to stay in Massachusetts, despite a cost premium.
Its reasons included the positive political climate in Massachusetts (a
structuralist issue), as well as risk-minimizing preference (a behavioralist issue).
Availability of capital was not a concern.
CORRESPONDENCE OF OBSERVATIONS WITH THE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Neoclassicist Issues
1. Transport cost/market proximity
Since all five firms surveyed were in the biotherapeutics segment, as a
major product or sole product segment, transport costs for supplier and markets
were not major factors, as expected. Product markets for all companies were
international, with truck and air shipments the most frequent modes of
transportation.
2. Labor factors
Labor availability was consistently cited by all firms at either the state or
site level as an important factor in the location decision. One firm, BASF, had
also evaluated labor quality carefully across states. Labor cost was cited less
frequently (three out of five firms). When other states were considered for the
plant location, the two alternative states most frequently evaluated were North
Carolina and the New Jersey-Philadelphia area, where concentrations of
pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms already existed. (North Carolina also
had lower overall costs.)
3. Agglomeration economies
Four of the five firms cited proximity to existing company facilities, other
biotechnology firms, and universities as a factor in the location decision. All
implicitly viewed localization economies as important by limiting consideration
to Massachusetts and other states with high biotechnology firm concentrations,
and therefore, labor skills concentrations. The influence of urbanization
economies was more mixed, since two firms (Alpha-Beta and Company X)
moved their manufacturing facilities to suburban locations. All five firms'
manufacturing locations have the necessary infrastructure (water, sewer,
roads), however.
4. Land
All firms looked at capital costs, including land price, when evaluating the
location decision. For only two firms (Alpha-Beta and Company X), did land
price (or financing) drive the decision (to suburban locations). Two firms (BASF
and Biogen) specifically viewed land costs as a minor factor when making the
decision, viewing agglomeration economies as more important. Accessibility of
land for transportation was viewed as an important location factor by four of the
five firms.
5. Tax climate
Costs of doing business, particularly taxes, were evaluated by all the
companies at the state or site level, or both. However, companies that seriously
considered other states also required that these lower cost states possess
biotechnology or pharmaceutical industry concentrations. North Carolina was
the favored alternative to Massachusetts.
6. Costs overall
Most companies performed either a capital cost or operating cost
evaluation, or both, when making the location or expansion decision, to assure
themselves that costs were reasonable. These cost evaluations were done for
the selected sites, or alternative sites (three companies formally costed out site
alternatives).
The interesting finding was that for three of the five companies, the site
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selected within Massachusetts was not the least cost site, according to company
officials. Although the cost evaluations assured all companies that costs were
within reason, other factors played a role in the location decision.
Behavioralist Issues
1. Use and availability of information
Biotechnology firms gather extensive quantitative information on costs,
for use in their manufacturing location decisions; however, they frequently do
not base the decision on strict cost minimization criteria. The utility of
information used to make location decisions is inherently limited by
inaccuracies in forecasting; this limitation was explicitly acknowledged by
officials at two companies.(Genzyme and Company X).
2. Preferences
Four of the five firms cited a positive local business climate as a factor in
the site selection. Other preferences that influenced location decisions
included: urban areas and a public presence (Genzyme), attractive sites
(Company X and BASF), and the known versus the unknown in the case of
expansion decisions (Company X and Biogen)
3. Alternative business goals
All the biotechnology firms had goals other than profit-maximization. Risk
minimization, or financial risk management, and growth, were cited as business
goals by four of the five. Managing growth, for example, in a risk-minimizing
way, led three companies to a choose locations with explicitly quantified costs
that were greater than those of alternative locations.
Structuralist Issues
1. Social forces
As expected, labor unionization was not an issue affecting any of the
biotechnology firms surveyed. The German political climate was important in
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BASF's decision to site its plant in Massachusetts. The state political climate
was important in Genzyme's decision to remain in Massachusetts, and the
national climate vis a vis tax incentives was considered in Company X's and
Biogen's decisions not to move off-shore.
Economic development assistance was used or sought by all firms
except Company X (in its initial 1986 location decision resulting in the move to
Suburbia). For Genzyme and Biogen, the role of the Boston Redevelopment
Authority and Cambridge Redevelopment Authority in retaining these firms in
urban locations was key. The stability of the Chapter 121A tax agreements for
these firms, and, particularly for Genzyme, the cost savings generated by the tax
agreement, played an important role in the location decision.
2. Capital availability
None of the companies, except for Alpha-Beta Technology (the smallest
and youngest of the five), had difficulty accessing sufficient capital for its plant
needs. Even Alpha-Beta had alternatives (if less certain or desirable) in the
proposal made for expansion at the Massachusetts Biotechnology Research
Park. However, only the one consistently profitable company, Biogen, was able
to plan permanent financing of its new plant through asset debt financing, an
indication of the credit-worthiness problems which still plague the industry. It
should be noted again here that the companies surveyed, with the exception of
Alpha-Beta, were among the largest in the state. They did not necessarily have
the capital availability problems that most Massachusetts companies face.
3. International/national scope
Only BASF, a division of a large international company, used location
criteria that were significantly different from those of the other firms. It was the
only firm to search initially at an international scale. Despite the international
plants owned by Genzyme, its criteria were similar to those of other, historically
locally rooted firms.
Because of its international characteristics, BASF was the sole firm to cite
proximity to the U.S. market, and communication with its headquarters.
Compared to the other companies examined in this study, it also more carefully
evaluated labor force characteristics through a study of the scientific
environment across various states, and deliberated for a longer time over the
decision. It was the least obviously cost-sensitive firm as well, and had
sufficient staff capacity to manage international operations.
LOCATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
All firms conducted the first or subsequent manufacturing search at
different scales, generally state-wide and local. (Company X made two
searches; the first was limited to Massachusetts, the second considered off-
shore locations). For those firms with available land, or adjacent sites
(Company X and Biogen), on-site expansion or extension was preferred over a
move to another state, despite the substantial cost savings that could be made
with such a move. Known labor availability; economies associated with
centralized facilities, a familiar regulatory environment, and better information
flow between manufacturing and research and development were the reasons
most often cited for in situ expansion.
All firms used a corporate small group to direct the location decision, with
the exception of BASF, which used a larger corporate study group. In all cases,
outside consultants were involved. At a minimum, a commercial broker was
used. Some firms also had accounting, legal, and management consulting
firms performing tax, permitting, and strategic analysis. In general, the decision-
making by firms generally followed the model shown in Figure 5.
All firms had provided for growth by incorporating shell expansion space,
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or additional site area, or both into their plant programs. Because of past
growth, most firms had acquired multiple sites (primarily leased) where various
functions were performed. Functional consolidation was planned (or at least,
had been considered) by four of the five companies, because of the perceived
advantages of direct research pilot plant and commercial plant proximity in
increasing the speed of commercialization.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and
Suggestions for Further Research
CONCLUSIONS
1. Firms used neoclassicist, behavioralist and structuralist factors in making
their manufacturing location decisions. All firms quantified costs, but did not
make their final decisions on the basis of cost alone. Availability or proximity to
labor was a key concern.
There appeared to be a relationship between a firm's position in its
product cycle, and the relative weights it assigned to neoclassicist,
behavioralist, and structuralist factors. The firms studied were in the growth
phase of their product cycle; most appeared to place relatively more emphasis
on behavioralist factors than on neoclassicist factors, as compared with the
same firms in the early phase of their product cycle, when behavioralist factors
were less significant, and neoclassicist factors more dominant. Examples of the
early dominance of neoclassicist factors included Company X's initial decision
to locate in Suburbia, and Alpha-Beta's decision to go to Rhode Island (Alpha-
Beta was still transitioning from its early phase to its growth phase when the
location decision was made). The growth phase also revealed an increasing
awareness of the importance of structuralist issues, with firms dealing more
proactively with state and local governments as they increased their space
requirements and presence in the community.
2. The five firms studied generally cited as important the same primary
location factors as high-technology companies overall. For example,
availability of workers was the top concern in the high technology firms
surveyed by Premus (see Chapter 2); as noted, this was also a major concern
for the biotechnology firms. Premus also viewed state/local tax structure as
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important in the decision; similarly, the biotechnology firms all evaluated taxes
at the state and/or site level. Community attitudes towards business (ranked
third by Premus) was cited by all firms as well. Cost of property and
construction, and transportation accessibility, were similarly cited by both the
high-technology survey and the five biotechnology firms.
3. All firms were risk-averse in their location decisions, seeking to control or
minimize, whenever possible, internal and external uncertainties. Known inputs
(for example, known state and local regulatory climates, existing labor
competencies) were valued greatly over unknowns at other locations. In part,
this occurred because of the complexity and uncertainty in each firm's product
lines: each had multiple products in various stages of development. Each firm
also faced uncertainty in technological processes (the feasibility and costs of
scale-up), in the Federal regulatory maze (approval or disapproval of products,
and, if approval were to come, when?), and in the manufacturing capacity
needed (because of dosage, size and share of market, and final technological
efficiency unknowns). Precise space planning was difficult, with so many
uncertainties, which are represented graphically in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. External and Internal Uncertainty (adapted from Cooper, 1974).
Biotechnology firms face relatively high external uncertainty in the FDA
approval process, in market size and share, and in capital availability(especially for small firms). Internal uncertainty with regard to manufacturing
location and space requirements arises from estimates of dosage requirements(which are difficult to project early on in product development) and of
technological efficiencies (which are subject to large and unpredictable
increases as a consequence of ongoing process improvement). Internal
uncertainty also arises from the unpredictable pace of discovery in the
development of new products. Firms often try to reduce the external uncertainty
in other areas, by staying within a known labor market, a known state and local
environment, and with appropriately zoned and permitted land. Firms deal with
internal uncertainties by staying with known management competencies.
4. Firms were dealing with managing growth, and frequently were making
the transition from leasing to purchase of facilities, because of the non-
fungibility of manufacturing space. Flexibility in conversion of space from
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research and development/pilot plant to commercial plant scale was desirable.
This flexibility was also attained through provision of expansion space (partial
shell building) or expansion land. Research and development space "led" the
siting decisions in two cases, with actual manufacturing planned for 12-24
months in the future, or even later.
5. Most plant siting was facilitated by economic development, or other
government assistance; plant siting in Boston and Cambridge, in particular,
required such assistance. In 1993, all firms surveyed found it desirable to ask
for some level of assistance in their future expansion plans. The level of
attention that local and state governments gave to the firms was partly a function
of the negotiating skills and political astuteness of the individual firms' CEO's.
Firms which were not publicly committed to Massachusetts, but which
announced that they were relocating to other states received the most positive
attention from the state and their communities. As of this writing, Massachusetts
and its communities, through the newly created Emerging Technology Fund,
and H.U.D. Chapter 108 loan guarantee program, appear to be on an economic
development-financing parity with Rhode Island and its industrial revenue
bonds. More significantly, the future holds the emergence of tax increment
financing, which has been a powerful redevelopment tool in other states
(Frieden and Sagalyn, 1989). Regulations for administering this program are at
a preliminary stage. Experience with such financing in other states suggests
that it will influence location decisions in favor of urban sites.
6. The evidence of suburbanization of manufacturing is mixed. The nature
of biotechnology manufacturing plants-frequently multi-story, with research
and development as well as pilot plants incorporated, and with high
infrastructure requirements-would seem to recommend large or small urban
areas, as exemplified by Boston, Cambridge, and Worcester. However, as seen
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in the cases of Company X and Alpha-Beta Technology, campus-like settings
are also desirable for cost, space, and highway accessibility reasons. No
dichotomy of urban vs. suburban tendencies was seen between large and small
firms.
7. Given the current growth stage of the biotherapeutics segment of the
biotechnology industry, manufacturing is still not sufficiently routinized to lead to
stand-alone, distant plants. Firms' perceived lack of capacity to staff a
completely separate plant further argues against out-of-state manufacturing
location choices. It is likely that manufacturing will be retained in
Massachusetts, at least in these early stages of commercialization. However,
as the industry matures, and manufacturing becomes routinized, a shift may
occur to lower cost locations.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Impact of New Legislation
The emerging effects of M.G.L. Chapter 19 on the biotechnology industry,
particularly the locational impacts of tax increment financing, should be an
interesting research topic within two to five years, as appropriate regulations are
put in place and implemented. The locational effect of this statute could lead to
urban sites for manufacturing. Malaterre (1993) has already recommended
evaluating investment tax credits and other tax incentives; these could now be
researched within the specific framework of Chapter 19.
Other Segments' Locational Decision-Making
Other biotechnology industry segments (e.g., ag-bio or equipment) may
differ from the biotherapeutics segment in the locational factors they consider in
manufacturing plant siting. Research into other industry segments' decision-
making would highlight the similarities and differences between the
biotherapeutics segment and these other segments. Analogously, a
comparison of Massachusetts biotechnology firms and their locational decision-
making with firms in other states (the San Francisco and New York-Tristate
areas, particularly) could reveal structuralist differences between the regions.
Understanding these differences from firms' perspectives could be useful for
other companies.
Focused Development Comparison
As noted in this paper, Worcester and Shrewsbury, as well as, more
recently, Grafton and the Charlestown Navy Yard, have been identified by the
real estate community as potential sites for biotechnology industry
development. The Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Park in Worcester is
successful and expanding, but whether the other sites will be successful real
estate developments is unknown. As these new sites undergo development in
the next few years, elements leading to their success or failure could be
researched and evaluated. Two criteria on which one could evaluate these sites
are profitability of the development and the scale of biotechnology industry
attracted to the sites.
Longitudinal Study
Biotechnology manufacturing facilities decisions have been rare, and are
just now becoming more common. Within a few years, the firms in this study
could be revisited to try to evaluate the success of the decisions they have
made.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire
I. Company Identity
Person completing survey
Position within company
Company name
Company division(s) at site
Address
CEO of parent company (if applicable)
Year and place of company founding
Whether company's founder lived in Massachusetts prior to founding
Was plant located to offer the CEO a short commute?
Can company be characterized as mature or growth company?
Are you making a profit overall; from products manufactured at manufacturing
plant?
II. Nature of this manufacturing plant
Major product lines manufactured
Number of product lines manufactured
Products made under patent protection?
How production is triggered (order, forecast, inventory levels)
Process type (batch, line flow, continuous flow)
How plant is controlled (profit center, cost center)
Management functions performed at the plant (e.g. R & D, sales)
Where warehousing and distribution for the plant is done
Year company/division first occupied plant
Area of plant site in acres
Square feet of plant
Number of manufacturing structures on-site
Type of major structure (single story, multistory)
Character of space required (e.g.., special construction, almost any type of
structure, etc.)
Is company/division sole occupant of site?
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How structure and site were acquired (e.g., built, purchased, leased)
Nature of site's previous use
Room for expansion on-site? (substantial, modest, none)
Average employment over the past year (full and part-time)
Predominant skill level of the workforce
Are most workers unionized?
Characterization of union attitude
Number of shifts typically run at the plant
Plant's use of water
Plant's use of various public utilities
Any disappointment with present site
Ill. Multi-plant Questions
Does company have more than one plant? If yes,
This plant relative to other company plants
Plant charters:
The "charter" for the plant (e.g., a particular product line shipped over the
division's entire domestic market area, a pilot plant to a full production plant,
etc.)
This plant's charter relative to others in the company
This plant's profitability/efficiency relative to others in the division
Dependence on other company facilities
Distance to division's headquarters
This plant "spun off" from another company plant? If yes,
How far away is that "mother" plant?
Comparison with that mother or base plant
What fraction of the employment
Product line (broader, narrower, same)
Products (more mature, newer, same)
Growth (faster, slower, same)
Production process (more capital-intensive, more labor-intensive, same)
Production runs (longer, shorter, same)
Labor (more skilled, less skilled, same)
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New product introduction (more, less, same)
Labor productivity (better, worse, same)
Labor unionization at mother plant
Labor situation at mother plant
IV. Markets, supplies and transportation
What is plant's market area? (international, national, regional, etc.)
Percent of output value shipped to other company plants
Where are plant's suppliers' located?
Percent of supplies value shipped to other company plants
Important transport modes other than truck
Relative importance of transportation costs
V. Some statistics
Approximate sales from this plant
Wage and salary costs plus fringes as a percent of sales
Materials costs as a percent of sales
Value of land and structures if owner (in $), if renter (in $/sq. ft.)
Value of equipment and inventories.
VI. ON-SITE PLANT EXPANSION
Information sought only for manufacturing plant expansion on site
Plant capacity considerations
Years in past decade when plant was expanded
Total square feet added
Operations this plant absorbed from other plants
Operations this plant spun off to new plants
As an alternative to on-site expansion, did company consider opening a new
branch or relocating this plant?
What factors argued most persuasively for on-site expansion?
What problems at the plant did on-site expansion cause or aggravate?
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VII. NEW PLANT OPENINGS
Information sought only for new manufacturing plant openings
Capacity and location consideration for this plant
Has plant expanded since it was first occupied?
When was the expansion?
Total square feet added
Since its opening, has plant absorbed operations which were then closed or
sold?
As an alternative to opening, did company seriously consider expanding on-site
elsewhere?
As an alternative to opening, did company seriously consider relocating another
plant?
What factors argued most persuasively for opening a new plant?
What states were seriously considered for this plant's location?
What factors were perceived as "musts" in selection of region and state? Of site
itself?
What factors were perceived as "desirable, if available" and helped to tip scales
in favor of this site?
Means by which labor climate was assessed
How town was first identified as possible site
State/local government aid taken advantage of (e.g., industrial revenue bonds;
help with environmental permits; tax concessions; new roads, sewerage
treatment, etc; zoning changes; training programs)
Relative to expectations, how plant fared on: costs of construction/staffing,
speed of construction/staffing, government regulatory delay,
speed/effectiveness of start-up, labor costs, labor productivity,
absenteeism/turnover/attitudes
Who first proposed a new plant? Division or corporate management
Was joint division/corporate staff team formed?
Who led site selection process? Division or corporate management
How many months was need for new plant debated?
How long did site search take?
Once site selected, how long was start-up for plant?
How many managers became involved in the decision to locate? In planning
the start-up?
Over how large an area was the search conducted? (locally, state, etc.)
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How many sites were considered?
Were these sites explicitly costed out?
How did sites get identified?
What kinds of outside consultation were engaged in for the search itself?
How is investment financed?
Characterize dealings with state and local officials
How did transition to new site occur? (e.g., warehousing first)
VIII. BUSINESS STRATEGY
Do you have a formal business plan?
What are your overall business goals?
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Appendix B: Summary of Chapter 19
Emerging Technology Fund
The Emerging Technology Fund will provide $15 million in the near-term
in bonding capacity through the Massachusetts Government Land Bank for new
manufacturing, research and development facilities, particularly in the fields of
biotechnology. The Fund will also make matching grants to public
instrumentalities and universities to induce federal and industry funding of
advanced research and development activities in emerging technologies and in
the new application of existing technologies in the Commonwealth. The Fund
has a $45 million limit; Massachusetts moral obligation bonds will be used for
the remaining bonding capacity over the first $15 million.
The Land Bank, in cooperation with an advisory council, will administer
the Fund, which allows for loans, guarantees, loan insurance or reinsurance,
equity investments and other financing or credit enhancing devices.
Investment Tax Credit
The legislation increases the current investment tax credit from one to
three percent. The provision has a three year sunset. The act also authorizes
the Department of Revenue to study the tax credit's effectiveness.
Economic Opportunity Areas
The legislation targets development projects within areas of high poverty
and unemployment to be eligible for various tax incentives and real estate tax
abatements, including: a 5% investment tax credit for tangible personal
property used in a certified project within an Economic Opportunity Area; and a
10% deduction of the cost of renovating any abandoned building within an
Economic Opportunity Area; both available to all businesses. The legislation
establishes an Economic Assistance Coordinating Council that will oversee the
creation of economic opportunity areas in the state. The legislation also
establishes eligibility criteria for municipalities an development projects.
Tax Increment Financing
The act also authorizes municipalities to use tax increment financing
(TIF) to support economic development projects. TIF is is premised upon
specific development commitments by property owners, and is designed to
promote particular projects. A TIF plan, subject to state approval, describes
proposed public and private investments in a TIF area, and is agreed upon by
the municipality and all private land owners in the TIF area. The municipality
agrees to "freeze" taxes at an established level for an agreed upon number of
years (no more than 15). TIF will pass the tax savings on to property owners for
use in project development, while ensuring that the development risk is borne
by those parties as well.
Sources: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Joint Committee on
Commerce and Labor, and the Massachusetts Office of Business Development.
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BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 1 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
Company Identity & History
Germany
(parent)
Cambridge
(current)
Worcester
Company headquarters address (4Q93) Cambridge Worcester Cambridge Cambridge
Divisional company? Yes No No No No
130 (Mass.) 705 (Mass.)
Average number of employees, 1993 118,000 (tot.) 1500 (tot.) 90 770 360
1988, Mass.
(parent 1866,
Year/place of company founding Germany) 1981, Mass. 1988, Mass. 1980, Mass. 1978, Geneva
Founder(s) lived in Mass prior to founding? No Yes Yes Yes Yes (one)
Subsidiary/Division of Another Company? Yes Yes No No No
Was plant located to offer CEO short commute No Probably No Yes No
Growth company? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Company profitable? No (intermittent) No No Yes-4 years
Nature of manufacturing
Biotherapeutics
(also
diagnostics,
Major product lines Biotherapeutics others Biotherapeutics Biotherapeutics Biotherapeutics
Biotherapeutic plant location Worcester Allston Smithfield, RI Suburbia Cambridge
3 now, 1 more
expected in None yet, 2 in 1 now, 5 in 2 now, 5 in
Number of products manufactured in-house None yet 1994 process process process
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 2 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
Nature of manufacturing, cont.
Yes, plus orphan
Patent protection? Yes (expected) drug status Yes Yes Yes
Production triggered by: N/A N/A N/A Forecast Forecast
Process type Batch Continuous flow Batch Batch refeed Batch
Cost/profit center? N/A Cost Cost Cost Cost
Anticipated QA, QA, QC,
Anticipated QC, some Anticipated QC, manufacturing
Management functions performed at plant admin., R & D admin. some admin. admin. Admin., R & D
GMP
warehousing at
plant; other at
leased From nearby
Warehousing & distribution Will be at plant Will be at plant Will be at plant warehouse leased building
1981 existing,
When existing or proposed plant first occupied Expected 3Q93 Expected 3Q93 Expected 1994 1988 1995 proposed
3 now, option 20 now, option
Area of plant site (acres) 30 to 9.4 to 30 51 5 to 6
Square feet of plant
All functions (existing) 39,400 340,000 40,000 400,000 198,000
Manufacturing (existing) None 185,000 10,000 30,000 45,000
130,000 plus 135,000
option for plus option for
All functions (proposed) 250,000 670,000 50,000 158,000 600,000
Manufacturing (proposed) up to 75,000 up to 130,000 1 up to 50,000 Unknown Unknown
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 3 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
Characteristics of plant/site
1 existing, 2 existing,
Number of manufacturing structures 1 proposed 1 proposed
Multi-story Multi-story 1 story + Multi-story Multi-story
special special mezzanine, special special
Type of space construction construction special const construction construction
R & D is leased,
will be Leased, with
Nature of acquisition (existing) terminated Leased Leased Purchased purchase option
Purchased, with
60-year ground Purchased, with purchase option
lease, structure purchase option Expansion on on expansion
Nature of acquisition (proposed) Purchased owned on 10 acres purchased site parcels
Instrumentation Heavy/light
Railyard, lab and green industrial,
Site's previous use Green field abattoir Green field field retrofit
Room for expansion? Substantial Substantial Substantial Substantial Substantial
Skill level of workforce High High High High High
Unionized? No No No No No
None yet, 3 None yet, 3 2 full, 1 lightly
Number of shifts None yet expected expected staffed 3
50,000 gal/day 55,000 gal/day 50,000 gal/day
Plant's use of water expected expected expected 50,000 gal/day 70,000 gal/day
Other public utility use Moderate High steam use Moderate Moderate Moderate
Limited airline "Fairly Retrofit, urban
service to Uncertainty of engineering Retrofit not environment,
Disappointment with present site? Worcester MWRA rates intensive" cost effective localregs
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 4 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
Characteristics of plant/site, cont.
R & D space, Betafectin Commercial
R & D center Ceredase trials, production of 2
and pilot plant, production, 3 commercial Bulk protein products; pilot
commercial other products, production; production; 5 plant for
production subcontracting space for new products on multiple
Manufacturing plant charter possible possible products trial scale biologics
Yes, but
consolidation
Dependence on other company facilities Yes anticipated Yes Yes Yes
250 mi. to
Distance to headquarters division HQ 2 mi. 30 mi. 20 mi. next door
Distance to research and development facility 0 (expected) 2 mi. 30 mi. 20 mi. next door
Market area International International International International International
International,
Suppliers International National National National most in US
Important transport mode other than truck Air Air Air Air Air
Relative importance of transport costs Low Low Low Low Low
$100 million
(equip. & bldg.
Value of proposed land, structures, equipment $90 million only) $38 million $135 million $35 million
Future on-site expansion of manufacturing
facilities
Status Space available Space available Space available Planned Planned
When? N/A N/A N/A 1995 1994-95
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 5 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
Future on-site expansion of manufacturing
facilities, cont.
Unknown, see Unknown, see
Square feet to be added N/A N/A N/A text text
New plant considered as alt. to expansion N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes
Major factors cited for on-site expansion
Ability to use in-place facilities X X
Better information flow, esp. with R & D X X
Better mgmt control/lower staffing necessary X
Friendly local regulatory environment X X
Receptive local business climate X
Labor availability X X
Known/stable costs X X
Flexibility of site for phased development X
Manufacturing plant already licensed X
Problems caused/aggravated by on-site
expansion
Limited by space constraints X
Disaster risk X
Retrofit problems (in past expansion) X
Higher costs relative to new plant elsewhere X
No ability to establish international market
presence X
No ability to use offshore tax advantages X_ _ _
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 6 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
New manufacturing plant openings
See previous
section:
decision is for
new plant, but
Expanding on-site considered as alt. to new Yes, wanted to similar to in-situ
plant? No No stay in MA No expansion
Factors that argued for opening new plant
Growth/capacity needs X X X X X
Existing site's space constraints X
Desire for vertical integration X X X X X
Proximity to US markets X
Restrictive home regulatory environment X
Maintain control of proprietary technology X
States/areas considered for plant location
Massachusetts X X X X X
New Jersey/Philadelphia area X X X
North Carolina X X X
Illinois X X
Washington, DC area X
Greater Denver X
California X X
Texas X X
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 7 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
States/areas considered for plant location,
cont.
Rhode Island X X
Minnesota X
New Hampshire X
South Dakota X
Maine X
Connecticut X
Factors perceived as "musts" in selection of N/A: only MA
state considered
Labor availability X X X
Costs of doing business (taxes, wages,
utilities) X X (taxes) X (taxes) X
Attractiveness of locale X
Cost of living for employees X
Positive regulatory climate X X X
Scientific environment X X
Ease of access to international HQ X
Available financing X
Factors cited as "musts" in selection of site
Adequate infrastructure (water, sewer, roads) X X X X X
Room for expansion X X X X X
Low or reasonable operating/capital costs, X (land cost
including taxes, utilities, land X X especially)
Positive local regulatory climate X X X X X
Positive local business climate X X X X
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 8 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
Factors cited as "musts" in selection of site,
cont.
Labor availability/cost X
Transportation accessibility X X X X
Nature of land availability (purchase or lease) X
"Desirable, if available" site factors
Proximity to existing company facilities X X
Proximity to other biotech firms or universities X X
Economic development assistance X X X
Attractiveness of site X X
Costs of living for employees X
Permits already in place or readily available X X
Public presence X
Demographic
measures of
education level,
literature
citations, Proximity of
educational known
institution biotech/pharma Interviews with
quality, no. of ceutical companies in
Ph.D.s per industry Demographic states
Means by which labor climate assessed capita concentration study Not assessed evaluated
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 9 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
How town was first identified as a possible
site
Pre-existing relationship with site owner X
Commercial broker identified X X X X
Proactive government response X X
1986, none
State/local government aid used used
Industrial revenue bonds X
Help with environmental and other permits X X X
Tax concessions X X X (applying for)
Promised, not
New infrastructure X, indirect delivered X
Zoning changes X
Training programs X X X
Public land ownership/assembly X X X
Turnkey construction X
Relative to expectations, how has plant
fared in: Not yet built
Costs of construction/staffing On budget Higher On budget Higher
Speed of construction/staffing On time delay On time On time
Permitting
faster than
Government regulatory delay LAs expected expected As expected As expected
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 10 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
Relative to expectations, how has plant
fared in: (cont.) Not yet built
Not yet opened,
but skeleton
crew on site in
Speed/effectiveness of start-up trailer Not yet opened Not yet opened As expected
Labor costs Higher N/A N/A As expected
Labor productivity Lower N/A N/A As expected
"Less loyal, Better than
Absenteeism/turnover/attitude more afraid" N/A N/A expected
Location decision process
Who first proposed new plant? Corporate Corporate Corporate Corporate Corporate
Yes, 6-10 in
Staff team formed? house Yes, 6 in house Yes, 4 in house Yes, 6 in house Yes, 5 in house
Manufacturing Chairman and
Who led site selection process? VP VP VP Senior VP VP, operations
For how many months was need for new plant
debated? N/A 7 3 to 4 12 2
How long did search take? 1.5 year 2-3 months 4-6 months 3 months 6 months
Construction period Summer 1993 Summer 1993 March 1994 May 1988 Winter 1995
How many managers involved in planning the
startup? 6 to 10 6 4 6 2
Several specific Several specific
Over how large an area was search conducted? International states 2 states Within state national regions
50 total, 5-6 4 total, 3 3 total, 2
How many sites considered? seriously seriously seriously 5 or 6 2 serio
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 11 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
Location decision process, cont.
Yes, for
construction Yes (1986)
Sites explicitly costed out? No Yes only No (1993) Yes
Site owner
Commercial approached Through state Commercial Commercial
How were sites identified? broker company officials broker broker
Accounting
Management firm,
consultant for Accounting commercial
regional search, firm, legal firm, broker,
commercial commercial engineering Commercial Commercial
What kinds of outside consulting were used? broker for site broker firm, legal firm broker broker
Stock offering, Company
6.75% earnings for
subordinated construction,
Earnings of convertible Rhode Island Stock (IPO), mortgage
How investment financed parent company debentures industrial bonds stock buy-out financing
Positive, but Responsive:
"Lots of "MA didn't have Good, but
communities power to do frustration with
don't have anything like environmental "Generally
Characterize dealings with state/local officials "Disappointing" staff" this" permitting positive"
closing of
leased R&D
space in
How did transition to new site occur? Cambridge Management Management Management Management
BASF Alpha-Beta
APPENDIX C 12 Bioresearch Genzyme Technology Company X Biogen
"Risk
management
strategy"
Risk (interpreted Entrepreneurial Risk
Growth, market minimization, here as cost growth with risk minimization,
Business Goals presence growth minimization) minimization growth
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